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Standing at a Constitutional Divide: 
Redefining State and Federal 
Requirements for Initiatives After 
Hollingsworth v. Perry 
Scott L. Kafker∗ 
David A. Russcol∗∗ 
Abstract 
In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Supreme Court denied 
standing to proponents of the California initiative prohibiting 
same-sex marriage, who wished to appeal a federal district court 
judge’s decision declaring the initiative unconstitutional. As 
suggested by the dissent, Hollingsworth has severe consequences 
for the twenty-four states in which the people can bypass elected 
officials and legislate directly through the initiative. The Supreme 
Court has established a clear constitutional divide between state 
and federal standing requirements for initiatives. Whereas states 
provide generous standing to proponents so officials do not 
exclusively control the defense of the people’s initiative process, the 
Supreme Court has instead narrowed the defense of initiatives in 
federal court to state officials or state agents. 
As federal litigation is virtually certain on most important 
initiatives, the Hollingsworth approach to standing distorts the 
initiative process, allowing government officials to nullify 
initiatives by refusing to defend them in federal court. They may 
do so for political as well as legal reasons, raising significant 
concerns for initiative drafters across the political spectrum. The 
federal standing doctrine creates an uneven playing field in 
which, often, no one is entitled to defend an initiative in federal 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ Judge on the Massachusetts Appeals Court; Adjunct Faculty Boston 
College Law School, where he teaches state constitutional law. 
 ∗∗ Associate at Zalkind Duncan & Bernstein LLP in Boston.  
230 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229 (2014) 
court if officials refuse. A decision invalidating a measure thus 
becomes unappealable. 
This Article analyzes state and federal approaches and 
proposes multiple methods to resolve the standing gap exposed by 
Hollingsworth. First, a special attorney could be appointed to 
represent the state if government officials decline to defend a 
measure. Second, states could deputize proponents as state agents 
and fill in the elements found missing in Hollingsworth. Third, 
states could set bounties for defending an initiative, analogous to 
a qui tam action. Fourth, proponents could be given a financial 
stake by assessing a filing fee, refundable if they successfully 
defend their initiatives. Finally, states could follow the strategy 
accepted in United States v. Windsor by compelling officials to 
take the ministerial actions necessary to appeal a measure’s 
invalidation even if they believed it unconstitutional. 
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I. Introduction 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry,1 holding that the proponents of the 
California initiative prohibiting same-sex marriage lacked 
standing to appeal a federal district court ruling declaring the 
initiative unconstitutional,2 demonstrates the unsettled state of 
standing law regarding initiatives, its deep fissures and divides, 
and even its gaping holes. Hollingsworth reveals not only the 
divisions within the Supreme Court regarding Article III 
standing requirements,3 but also the very different federal and 
                                                                                                     
 1. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). For simplicity, we refer to the Supreme Court’s 
decision as Hollingsworth and the California Supreme Court’s opinion in the 
same case as Perry.  
 2. See id. at 2668 (“Because petitioners have not satisfied their burden to 
demonstrate standing to appeal the judgment of the District Court, the Ninth 
Circuit was without jurisdiction to consider the appeal.”). 
 3. See id. at 2662–64 (finding that petitioners failed to present a 
particularized injury and rejecting the argument that petitioners had, through 
their unique relationship to the measure, authority to represent state interests 
in court); id. at 2668–70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (finding that the petitioners 
had authority, under state law and through their special relationship to the 
initiative measure, to represent state interests and therefore had standing at 
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state conceptions of standing for initiatives and the resulting 
distortion of the initiative process.4 In those states where statutes 
or constitutional amendments, or both measures, may be 
initiated and passed directly by the people, state courts have 
interpreted their laws to provide generous standing to both 
petitioner-proponents5 and opponents of initiatives.6 The 
Supreme Court, in contrast, has narrowly construed Article III’s 
standing requirements, especially for initiative petitioners.7 
Thus, those who have invoked the power to change the state 
constitution or laws through the initiative, and likely defended 
their efforts in state court, may find their route to the federal 
courthouse obstructed or blocked altogether. 
                                                                                                     
the appellate level). 
 4. Compare id. at 2662–63 (majority opinion) (rejecting the argument that 
proponents of initiative measures have a unique relationship to the measure 
that allows them to defend it in federal litigation), and id. at 2670–71 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting) (relying on the purpose and history of the initiative system to 
justify the California Supreme Court’s ruling that proponents of the initiative 
measure had adequate authority to represent the state and its interests), with 
Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Cal. 2011) (finding that, because the 
initiative process is designed to allow the people of the state to amend the state 
constitution or enact statutes when public officials decline to do so, proponents 
of initiative measures have authority to represent the state in litigation 
concerning the initiative).   
 5. For clarity, we use the terms “proponents” and “petitioners” to indicate 
the individuals or group designated as the official sponsors of the initiative 
petition under state law; these individuals may be the initial few signers of the 
petition or a political committee established to promote the petition. See, e.g., 
ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.030(3) (2013) (detailing the necessary components of the 
application, including the designation of an initiative committee consisting of 
three of the official sponsors of the bill); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9001(a) (2013) 
(labeling those voters requesting title and summary from the attorney general 
as “proponents”); OR. REV. STAT. § 250.045(6) (2013) (“The cover of an initiative 
or referendum petition shall designate the name and residence address of not 
more than three persons as chief petitioners.”). In contrast, we use “supporters” 
to refer to those who are in favor of an initiative’s passage or defense but do not 
have the special status of official sponsors. As state laws typically do not 
differentiate in the same way among the various individuals or groups who are 
against an initiative, we apply the term “opponents” to anyone seeking to 
challenge an initiative in court. 
 6. See infra Part IV.A (noting that state judges typically allow actions to 
proceed where the state legislature authorizes private enforcement of public 
rights, regardless of any constitutional standing requirements).   
 7. See infra Part V (discussing the “injury in fact” standing requirement of 
federal courts).   
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This Article addresses pre- and post-election standing in 
state court by petitioners, other supporters of initiatives, and 
opponents of initiatives.8 On the federal side, it responds to 
Hollingsworth, which has raised more questions than it answers 
regarding Article III standing.9 This Article seeks to define state 
and federal standing requirements in a way that fulfills the 
purpose of the initiative process—to bypass indifferent or 
recalcitrant government officials;10 to prevent one-sided litigation 
by providing both defenders and opponents comparable rights to 
argue and appeal constitutional and other legal questions; and to 
respect the latest pronouncement by the Supreme Court 
concerning Article III requirements. Although the Supreme Court 
majority appeared unconcerned about the constitutional crevasse 
it created on standing for initiatives,11 we propose several 
possible paths across or around the divide, recognizing that some 
are riskier than others.12 
II. The Stand-off on Standing Revealed by Hollingsworth v. Perry 
As previously stated, the state–federal constitutional divide 
on standing in the initiative context, and the resulting problems, 
are starkly revealed by the decision of the California Supreme 
Court and the majority and dissenting opinions in the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the Proposition 8 litigation. After the 
California Supreme Court found in 2008 that existing laws 
limiting the official designation of marriage to opposite-sex 
couples violated the Equal Protection Clause of the California 
Constitution,13 an initiative petition was drafted to amend the 
state constitution.14 That initiative petition, which would be 
                                                                                                     
 8. Infra Part V.  
 9. Infra Part VI. 
 10. Infra Part VI.  
 11. Infra Part V.  
 12. Infra Part VI.B. 
 13. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451–52 (Cal. 2008) (limiting 
marriage to same-sex couples is unconstitutional), superseded by constitutional 
amendment as stated in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 14. See Proposition 8: Official Title and Summary, in CALIFORNIA GENERAL 
ELECTION, NOVEMBER 4, 2008: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 54 (2008), 
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/title-sum/pdf/prop8-title-summary.pdf 
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known as Proposition 8, provided: “Only marriage between a man 
and a woman is valid and recognized in California.”15 The 
California Supreme Court thereafter rejected various procedural 
and substantive challenges to the constitutionality of Proposition 
8 under California law.16 Two same-sex couples wishing to marry 
then brought suit in federal court, claiming that Proposition 8 
violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.17 The 
defendants named in the complaint were the Governor of 
California, the Attorney General of California, and other state 
and local officials responsible for overseeing marriage in 
California.18 All of these officials declined to defend the law.19 The 
official proponents of the initiative were, however, allowed to 
intervene to defend the law in the district court.20 After a trial on 
the merits, the district court declared Proposition 8 
unconstitutional and permanently enjoined California officials 
from enforcing the law.21 The California officials chose not to 
                                                                                                     
(summarizing Proposition 8 as an initiative constitutional amendment that 
eliminates the right of same-sex couples to marry in California).   
 15. Id.; see also Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1007–08 (Cal. 2011) 
(discussing the development of Proposition 8).   
 16. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009) (rejecting the 
argument that Proposition 8 is an impermissible constitutional revision that 
violates the separation of powers doctrine and is invalid under an “inalienable 
rights” theory and also concluding that it may only be altered by California 
voters). 
 17. See Perry, 265 P.3d at 1007–08 (detailing the procedural history of the 
case and noting that plaintiffs’ complaint “alleged that Proposition 8 violates the 
due process and equal protection clauses of the federal Constitution”). 
 18. Id. at 1008. 
 19. See id. (“In their answers, the named defendants other than the 
Attorney General refused to take a position on the merits of plaintiffs’ 
constitutional challenge and declined to defend the validity of Proposition 8. The 
answer filed by the Attorney General also declined to defend the 
initiative . . . .”).   
 20. See id. (noting the district court’s recognition of the standing of 
proponents of initiative measures).  
 21. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003–04 (N.D. Cal. 
2010) (concluding that Proposition 8 “prevents California from fulfilling its 
constitutional obligation to provide marriages on an equal basis,” and because it 
is unconstitutional, the official defendants are prohibited from applying or 
enforcing it). 
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appeal,22 and when the petitioners did, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals certified a question to the California Supreme Court:  
Whether under Article II, Section 8 of the California 
Constitution or otherwise under California law, the official 
proponents of an initiative measure possess either a 
particularized interest in the initiative’s validity or the 
authority to assert the State’s interest in the initiative’s 
validity, which would enable them to defend the 
constitutionality of the initiative upon its adoption or appeal a 
judgment invalidating the initiative, when the public officials 
charged with that duty refuse to do so.23  
The California Supreme Court responded in the affirmative, 
declaring:  
[B]ecause the initiative process is specifically intended to 
enable the people to amend the state Constitution or to enact 
statutes when current government officials have declined to 
adopt (and often have publicly opposed) the measure in 
question, the voters who have successfully adopted an 
initiative measure may reasonably harbor a legitimate concern 
that the public officials who ordinarily defend a challenged 
state law in court may not, in the case of an initiative 
measure, always undertake such a defense with vigor or with 
the objectives and interests of those voters paramount in 
mind. As a consequence, California courts have routinely 
permitted the official proponents of an initiative to intervene 
or appear as real parties in interest to defend a challenged 
voter-approved initiative measure in order “to guard the 
people’s right to exercise initiative power” or, in other words, 
to enable such proponents to assert the people’s, and hence the 
state’s, interest in defending the validity of the initiative 
measure.24  
The California Supreme Court stated that proponents have 
“a unique role in the initiative process”25 and have “a unique 
relationship to the voter-approved measure that makes them 
especially likely to be reliable and vigorous advocates for the 
                                                                                                     
 22. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“Proponents appealed the district order, but the named official defendants did 
not.”). 
 23. Id. at 1193. 
 24. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Cal. 2011) (quoting Bldg. Indus. 
Ass’n v. City of Camarillo, 41 Cal. 3d 810, 822 (1986)). 
 25. Id. at 1024. 
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measure and to be so viewed by those whose votes secured the 
initiative’s enactment into law.”26 The court advised that by 
allowing official proponents to assert the state’s interest, the 
state 
(1) assures voters who supported the measure and enacted it 
into law that any residual hostility or indifference of current 
public officials to the substance of the initiative measure will 
not prevent a full and robust defense of the measure to be 
mounted in court on the people’s behalf, and (2) ensures a 
court faced with the responsibility of reviewing and resolving a 
legal challenge to an initiative measure that it is aware of and 
addresses the full range of legal arguments that reasonably 
may be proffered in the measure’s defense.27 
Accordingly, the court held: 
In a postelection challenge to a voter-approved initiative 
measure, the official proponents of the initiative are 
authorized under California law to appear and assert the 
state’s interest in the initiative’s validity and to appeal a 
judgment invalidating the measure when the public officials 
who ordinarily defend the measure or appeal such a judgment 
decline to do so.28  
The Ninth Circuit, heavily relying on the analysis of the 
California Supreme Court, agreed and held that such 
authorization was sufficient to create Article III standing.29 The 
Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, 
reversed.30 
The majority started from the premise that Article III of the 
U.S. Constitution limits the judicial power of federal courts to 
resolving cases and controversies.31 As part of the case or 
                                                                                                     
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1006. 
 28. Id. at 1007. 
 29. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1070–73 (9th Cir. 2012) (examining 
the standing of proponents and noting that their role in asserting the state’s 
interest is comparable to the role normally held by the public officials who 
declined to defend the law). 
 30. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013). 
 31. See id. at 2659 (“[P]etitioners . . . ask us to decide whether the Equal 
Protection Clause ‘prohibits . . . California from defining marriage as the union 
of a man and a woman.’ [We] have authority . . . to answer such questions only if 
necessary to do so in the course of deciding an actual ‘case’ or 
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controversy requirement, a litigant must demonstrate standing.32 
As further interpreted by the Supreme Court, standing under 
Article III requires the “litigant to prove that he has suffered a 
concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the 
challenged conduct, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
judicial decision.”33 Such standing must be maintained 
“throughout all stages of litigation.”34 Therefore, appellants must 
satisfy standing requirements, just as plaintiffs filing in the first 
instance are required to do.35  
In Hollingsworth, it was undisputed that the couples seeking 
to marry had standing when they initiated the litigation in the 
district court, as Proposition 8 precluded them from marrying.36 
There was also no question that the State of California suffered 
an injury cognizable under Article III when the district court 
concluded that a provision of its constitution was invalid under 
federal law.37 The issue, then, was whether the official 
proponents had standing to appeal the district court’s decision 
when the California officials declined to do so, either because they 
had suffered concrete injury themselves or because they could 
litigate on the state’s behalf.38 The Court concluded that the 
proponents could not establish standing on either theory.39 
                                                                                                     
‘controversy.’”(citation omitted)). 
 32. See id. (“For there to be such a case or controversy, it is not enough that 
the party invoking the power of the court have a keen interest in the issue. That 
party must also have ‘standing’ . . . .”). 
 33. Id. at 2661 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 
(1992)). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. (“[S]tanding ‘must be met by persons seeking appellate review, 
just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance.’” (citing 
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997))). 
 36. See id. at 2662 (explaining that respondents had standing in district 
court because their desire to marry and obtain an “official sanction” from the 
state was prohibited by Proposition 8). 
 37. See id. at 2664 (“No one doubts that a State has a cognizable interest ‘in 
the continued enforceability’ of its laws that is harmed by a judicial decision 
declaring a state law unconstitutional.” (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 
137 (1986))). 
 38. See id. at 2662–64 (discussing the proponents’ argument that they hold 
a unique role in the enforcement of the law, allowing them to act on behalf of the 
state). 
 39. See id. at 2664 (explaining that the proponents have not suffered an 
injury in fact and therefore also have no right to assert the state’s interest); id. 
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As to injury in fact, the Court reasoned that once the 
initiative passed, the official proponents had no special role and 
“no ‘direct stake’ in the outcome of their appeal.”40 Rather, “[t]heir 
only interest in having the District Court order reversed was to 
vindicate the constitutional validity of a generally applicable 
California law.”41 As individuals, they therefore had no greater 
interest in the case than any other member of the public.42 
The Court also rejected the California Supreme Court’s 
analysis that the proponents were authorized to assert the state’s 
interest, concluding that they were not state officials or agents of 
the people entitled to defend the state’s interest in the legality of 
its laws.43 The Court emphasized that it had “never before upheld 
the standing of a private party to defend the constitutionality of a 
state statute when state officials have chosen not to” and 
“decline[d] to do so for the first time here.”44 The Court relied on 
the current Restatement of Agency to distinguish the authority 
the petitioners had from the responsibility of an agent.45 As 
“petitioners answer to no one,” there is no process for their 
removal, and they owe no fiduciary obligation to the people of 
California, they are not agents.46 The decision also made 
reference to the fact that the proponents had not claimed to 
represent the state in the district court, as well as the California 
Supreme Court’s failure to use the talismanic words of agency,47 
                                                                                                     
at 2666–67 (discussing the lack of any agency relationship between the 
proponents and the state). 
 40. Id. at 2662. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. (denying proponents’ special interest claim because they held a 
unique role in Proposition 8’s enactment but not its enforcement, and therefore 
they have “no ‘personal stake’ in defending its enforcement that is 
distinguishable from the general interest of every citizen of California” (citing 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992))). 
 43. See id. at 2666–67. 
 44. Id. at 2668. 
 45. See id. at 2666 (“‘An essential element of agency is the principal’s right 
to control the agent’s actions.’ Yet, petitioners answer to no one; they decide for 
themselves, with no review, what arguments to make and how to make them.” 
(quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, cmt. f (2005))). 
 46. See id. at 2666–67 (discussing various reasons why the proponents may 
not claim to act as agents of the state for purposes of this litigation). 
 47. See id. (noting that neither the state court nor the Ninth Circuit 
described petitioners as “agents of the people” or of the state and that when 
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but it is unclear whether either of these factors were key 
elements for the Court’s holding. The majority’s agency test is 
discussed in more detail in Part VI.  
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and 
Sotomayor, issued a caustic dissent.48 The dissenters pointedly 
stated that “Article III does not require California, when deciding 
who may appear in court to defend an initiative on its behalf, to 
comply with the Restatement of Agency or with this Court’s view 
on how a State should make its laws or structure its 
government.”49 Rather, the state is empowered to define the 
status and authority of who may defend its laws against a 
constitutional challenge, including an initiative’s proponents.50 
Recognizing those powers, the dissent declared that “a proponent 
has the authority to appear in court and assert the State’s 
interest in defending an enacted initiative when the public 
officials charged with that duty refuse to do so.”51 The state’s 
determination, the dissenters declared, “is binding on this Court. 
And that definition is fully sufficient to establish the standing 
and adversity that are requisites for justiciability under Article 
III of the United States Constitution.”52 
The dissenters also complimented and incorporated much of 
the reasoning of the California Supreme Court, stressing its 
analysis of the purposes of the initiative process itself53 and the 
unique status and relationship of the proponents to the initiatives 
they propose.54 In contrast, the dissenters emphasized that the 
                                                                                                     
facing the Ninth Circuit, petitioners argued not for agency status, but for a 
unique status based on their “interests as official proponents”). 
 48. Id. at 2668–75 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 2668. 
 50. See id. (finding California’s definition of proponents’ authority to defend 
a challenged initiative to be binding on the federal courts).   
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. (noting that the California Supreme Court felt a proponent’s 
authority to assert the state’s interest in defending an initiative measure where 
officials fail to do so is “essential to the integrity of [California’s] initiative 
process”); id. at 2670–71 (“The very object of the initiative system is to establish 
a lawmaking process that does not depend upon state officials. In California, the 
popular initiative is necessary to implement ‘the theory that all power of 
government ultimately resides in the people.’” (quoting Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 
1002, 1016 (Cal. 2011))).   
 54. See id. at 2668–70 (reiterating the Supreme Court of California’s 
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majority’s “reasoning does not take into account the fundamental 
principles or the practical dynamics of the initiative system in 
California, which uses this mechanism to control and to bypass 
public officials—the same officials who would not defend the 
initiative, an injury the Court now leaves unremedied.”55 The 
dissenters were also concerned about the significant implications 
for the twenty-six other states that have authorized the initiative 
or referendum.56 
The dissenters identified other troubling consequences of the 
majority decision. They wrote: “A prime purpose of justiciability 
is to ensure vigorous advocacy, yet the Court insists upon 
litigation conducted by state officials whose preference is to lose 
the case.”57 Additionally, a doctrine designed to limit judicial 
power and to allow disputes of public policy to be resolved by the 
political process rather than the courts has instead empowered a 
single federal district court to declare unconstitutional a law 
initiated and passed by the people of a state, and if that decision 
is challenged, not “to allow a State’s authorized representatives to 
defend” the people’s initiative.58 At oral argument, Justice 
Kennedy referred to this phenomenon as a “one-way ratchet” 
whereby the court’s injury in fact requirement would mean that 
only one side could appeal an adverse decision on the validity of 
an initiative.59 If opponents scored a victory in any district 
                                                                                                     
reasons for holding that proponents have a special relationship to the initiative 
measure and therefore have standing, including proponents’ knowledge and 
understanding of the law as well as their stake in the outcome of the initiative).   
 55. Id. at 2668. 
 56. Id.  Twenty-four of these states have an initiative process; two use only 
the referendum, which allows voters to approve or reject laws passed by the 
legislature but does not permit them to draft the laws that are put to a vote. See 
M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 11–12 (2003) (defining 
initiatives and referendums and comparing the availability of these measures in 
each state). 
 57. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2674 (2013). 
 58. See id. (“[R]ather than honor the principle that justiciability exists to 
allow disputes of public policy to be resolved by the political process rather than 
the courts, here the Court refuses to allow a State’s authorized representative to 
defend the outcome of a democratic election.” (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737, 750–52 (1984))).   
 59. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 29–30, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 
S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_ 
arguments/argument_transcripts/12-144.pdf (“[T]his is a one-way ratchet as it 
favors the State and allows governors and other constitutional officers in 
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court,60 no appeal could be taken to the court of appeals; a win at 
the court of appeals could not be reviewed by the Supreme 
Court.61 
The one-way ratchet seems to be a significant problem and 
may explain the concern expressed across the political spectrum 
with the Hollingsworth decision, even by the strongest 
proponents of same-sex marriage, including former San Francisco 
Mayor and current California Lieutenant Governor Gavin 
Newsom.62  Mr. Newsom asked rhetorically, “What if . . . voters 
pass a progressive proposition and a conservative Republican 
governor or attorney general refuses to defend it against legal 
challenges?”63 There are a number of initiatives, championed by 
both liberals and conservatives, that depend heavily, if not 
exclusively, on a defense by the government, as the government 
alone can satisfy the injury in fact requirement on the defense 
side.64 Initiatives designed to protect the environment,65 defend 
                                                                                                     
different States to thwart the initiative process.”). 
 60. Indeed, in a state like California that encompasses multiple judicial 
districts, different groups of plaintiffs might sue statewide officials in any or all 
district courts, needing to secure only one favorable ruling to achieve their goal. 
 61. Supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Hollingsworth, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2668 (“Because petitioners have not satisfied their burden to demonstrate 
standing to appeal the judgment of the District Court, the Ninth Circuit was 
without jurisdiction to consider the appeal.”). 
 62. See Tamara Audi, Worries Swirl over California’s Initiatives, WALL ST. 
J., July 1, 2013, at A3 (discussing the concerns of activists and government 
officials that the Hollingsworth decision weakens the power of voters to enact 
laws through then initiative system). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Cf. Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When 
Conservative Plaintiffs Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 
551, 559–78 (2012) [hereinafter Elliott, Standing Lessons] (providing examples 
of issues that often prove difficult to defend due to standing, including 
environmental rights, civil rights, same-sex marriage, and health care). 
Initiatives falling in this category likely include abortion bans, marijuana 
decriminalization, and gambling legalization, as well as same-sex marriage 
measures. See Scott L. Kafker & David A. Russcol, The Eye of a Constitutional 
Storm: Pre-Election Review by the State Judiciary of Initiative Amendments to 
State Constitutions, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1279, 1280 (2012) (“Turbulent 
societal issues . . . are being decided through initiative petitions to amend state 
constitutions.” (citing G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 160–
61 (1998))).   
 65. Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–64 (1992) (finding 
that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge agency action because, while it was 
possible that certain agency-funded projects threatened the listed species, they 
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animal rights,66 enforce nondiscrimination in the private sector 
through tax policy,67 preclude vouchers for public school students, 
limit abortion rights, or, as in Hollingsworth, define marriage as 
between a man and a woman, have all been passed by very 
different political forces.68 For all of these initiatives, there are 
obvious plaintiffs—companies emitting pollutants in 
environmental cases, animal owners in animal rights cases, 
attendees of private schools, pregnant women, same-sex 
couples—but often no obvious private defendants. If government 
officials can simply decide not to defend the initiative, 
government officials are being given a veto over the initiative 
process itself.69 As no one can defend the litigation if the 
government refuses to do so, one side is allowed to control the 
outcome.70 Even though all the usual principles of standing are 
satisfied if the government chooses to defend the initiative (in 
other words, the case presents legal issues appropriate for 
resolution in court, there is adversity of interest, and the 
plaintiffs and the state would each be concretely injured by an 
                                                                                                     
failed to show how such harm would produce any injury to the plaintiffs 
themselves). 
 66. Cf. Elliott, Standing Lessons, supra note 64, at 584 (explaining that 
because an endangered species is not a legal person whose harm is cognizable in 
court, those suing to protect such species must argue that they depend on the 
species for research, recreation, or aesthetic enjoyment (citing Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563–64 (1992))).   
 67. Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752–61 (1984) (finding that holding 
the Internal Revenue Service accountable for its legal obligation to enforce 
nondiscrimination policies does not, in itself, provide standing when petitioners 
have suffered no personal injury from the discriminatory treatment).   
 68. Cf. Elliott, Standing Lessons, supra note 64, at 552–53, 562 (noting that 
while most critics of the standing doctrine are liberals attempting to protect the 
environment or vindicate civil rights, conservative plaintiffs in recent cases 
found themselves barred by the standing doctrine as well). 
 69. See Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1006–07 (Cal. 2011) (finding that 
because state officials do not have the authority to directly veto an initiative 
measure, they may not attempt to effectively veto such measures by denying 
initiative proponents the authority to defend the law); see also Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2671 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
providing a “de facto veto” to government officials would undermine the 
initiative system).   
 70. See Perry, 265 P.3d at 1024 (“The initiative power would be 
significantly impaired if there were no one to assert the state’s interest in the 
validity of the measure when elected officials decline to defend it in court or to 
appeal a judgment invalidating the measure.”). 
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unfavorable decision), particularized injury standing 
requirements allow only one side to argue and control the 
outcome.71 This is true even though the majority of people voted 
for just the opposite position.72 Government officials are being 
allowed to substitute their judgment for the judgment of the 
people themselves regarding the defense of the initiative, even 
though the initiative is premised on a rejection of such deference 
to government officials.73 The people’s only recourse is to vote out 
their elected officials,74 but there are some proposals (such as 
term limits) that any set of elected officials is likely to oppose.75 
And in any case, the initiative process is based on the idea that 
the people do not have to act through government officials but 
can act directly.76  
In sum, the initiative process raises issues that are difficult 
to resolve within the traditional standing inquiry, and the 
Hollingsworth approach is deeply problematic, causing significant 
constitutional division and confusion. In response, this Article 
seeks to lay out sensible standing rules for proponents and 
opponents of initiatives, in state and federal courts, pre- and post-
                                                                                                     
 71. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668–69, 2671, 2674–75 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that, where the California Supreme Court upheld the 
initiative process to ensure “vigorous advocacy,” the majority’s opinion limits the 
ability of the state’s authorized representatives to defend the initiative).   
 72. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Prop. 8 Deserved a Defense, L.A. TIMES (June 
28, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/28/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky-
proposition-8-initiatives-20130628 (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (“The state was 
certainly within its rights to refuse to defend a law that officials believed to be 
unconstitutional . . . . But Proposition 8’s supporters were left understandably 
upset. A majority of Californians had voted to ban gay marriage . . . and now the 
state would no longer defend the law.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 73. See Perry, 265 P.3d at 1006 (discussing the purpose of the initiative 
system and its intention “to enable the people to amend the state Constitution 
or to enact statutes when current government officials have declined to 
adopt . . . the measure in question”). 
74.  See Doyle v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 858 N.E.2d 1090, 1096 
(Mass. 2006) (“Those [officials] who now seek to avoid their lawful obligations 
[in the initiative process] . . . ultimately will have to answer to the people who 
elected them.”). 
 75. See KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 161–62 
(2009) (discussing the growing popularity of term limit initiatives and the 
refusal of most legislatures to adopt such reforms). 
 76. See supra note 73. 
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election. To do so, we must start with a better understanding of 
the background and role of initiatives under state and federal 
law.  
III. The Initiative: Its History, Purpose, and Place in State and 
Federal Constitutional Law 
The initiative was first introduced by the Populist and 
Progressive movements of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in response to political corruption, the 
outsized influence of railroads and other corporations, and a 
widespread belief that the people had lost control of the political 
process.77 Currently, the constitutions of twenty-four states 
provide the people with the power to pass statutes or 
constitutional amendments—or both—through the initiative 
process.78 
The inherent right of the people to reform their own 
governments is fundamental in American political history.79 It 
has been a key tenet of American constitutional law, especially 
emphasized in state constitutions.80 For example, the 
                                                                                                     
 77. See Kafker & Russcol, supra note 64, at 1283 (“[The initiative system] 
was championed by Populists and Progressives of the early twentieth century as 
a remedy for political corruption, the influence of big business, and the 
perceived inability or unwillingness of legislators to represent the interests of 
the body politics.” (citing Marvin Krislov & Daniel M. Katz, Taking State 
Constitutions Seriously, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 304 (2008))); David 
B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative Referendum 
Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 16 (1995) (discussing the history of the 
initiative); Kenneth P. Miller, Constraining Populism: The Real Challenge of 
Initiative Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037, 1039–44 (2001) (detailing the 
history of the Populist and Progressive movements and their influence on 
modern initiative reform). 
 78. See WATERS, supra note 56, at 12 (comparing the types of initiative 
processes available in each state and comparing states with direct and indirect 
initiative amendments, direct and indirect initiative statutes, and popular 
referendum). Of these, six have only a statutory initiative; three allow only 
initiated constitutional amendments; and fifteen permit both. Id. 
 79. See Kafker & Russcol, supra note 64, at 1286 (“The inherent right of 
the people to reform their own governments is a fundamental aspect of 
American political thought and action, especially at the state level.”). 
 80. See id. (noting that the right of the people to reform their government 
was “the battle cry of the American Revolution and a historic emphasis in state 
constitutions”). 
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Massachusetts Constitution has provided since 1780 that “the 
people alone have an incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible 
right to institute government; and to reform, alter, or totally 
change the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity and 
happiness require it.”81 Government officials, “whether 
legislative, executive, or judicial, are . . . at all times accountable 
to them.”82  
Not surprisingly, in an era when constitutional conventions 
are nonexistent at the federal level and exceedingly rare in the 
states and there is a widespread perception that government is 
unresponsive to the concerns of ordinary people, the initiative is 
popular and powerful.83 The initiative is widely utilized to effect 
statutory and constitutional change in the states. From 2006 to 
2012, there were 155 initiative statutes and 104 initiative 
constitutional amendments on state ballots, about forty percent of 
which passed.84 Many of the most controversial issues of our 
                                                                                                     
 81. MASS. CONST. art. VII. 
 82. Id. art. V. 
 83. See John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2012, in COUNCIL 
OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3, 4 (2013), 
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/drupal/system/files/dinan_2013_1.pdf (providing 
the number of initiatives and conventions since 2008); Kafker & Russcol, supra 
note 64, at 1285–86 (“Even in states such as California, where widespread use of 
the initiative process has led to what The Economist and the state’s own former 
Chief Justice refer to as a dysfunctional democracy, the initiative retains its 
powerful place in political life.”); Magleby, supra note 77, at 26–31 (illustrating 
the increased use of initiatives in the last several decades); cf. MILLER, supra 
note 75, at 70–71 (“In the states where it is strongest, the initiative process has 
become no less than a fourth branch of government . . . .”). 
 84. Dinan, supra note 83, at 4 tbl. A; John Dinan, State Constitutional 
Developments in 2009, in COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3, 
5 tbl. A (2010), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/drupal/system/files/01_Cr.pdf; 
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, INITIATIVE USE 2 (2013), 
http://iandrinstitute.org/IRI%20Initiative%20Use%20(2013-1).pdf; see also 
2006 Ballot Measures, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/2006_ 
ballot_measures (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (listing the state ballot measures in 
2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 2007 Ballot Measures, 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/2007_ballot_measures (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2013) (listing the state ballot measures in 2007) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); 2008 Ballot Measures, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/2008_ballot_measures (last visited Oct. 13, 
2013) (listing the state ballot measures in 2008) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); 2009 Ballot Measures, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/2009_ballot_measures (last visited Oct. 13, 
2013) (listing the state ballot measures in 2009) (on file with the Washington 
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time—including abortion regulation, casino gambling, collective 
bargaining rights, election reform, same-sex marriage, health 
care, drug legalization or decriminalization, and renewable 
energy—are being decided through the initiative process.85 
Despite its significant problems, which are well-reviewed in the 
literature86 but beyond the scope of this Article, the initiative 
process is an important prerogative of the people; they have no 
intention of giving up their right to voice and impose their views 
and direct constitutional change.87  
The initiative process is, however, a distinct creation of state 
constitutional law with no federal pedigree or counterpart.88 
There is no means for direct popular constitutional or statutory 
changes specified in the U.S. Constitution.89 Indeed, the Framers 
of the federal Constitution expressed great skepticism regarding 
direct democracy. As James Madison explained in The Federalist 
                                                                                                     
and Lee Law Review); 2010 Ballot Measures, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/2010_ballot_measures (last visited Oct. 13, 
2013) (listing the state ballot measures in 2010) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); 2011 Ballot Measures, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/2011_ballot_measures (last visited Oct. 13, 
2013) (listing the state ballot measures in 2011) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); 2012 Ballot Measures, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/2012_ballot_measures (last visited Oct. 13, 
2013) (listing the state ballot measures in 2012) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 85. See Kafker & Russcol, supra note 64, at 1280. 
 86. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 293, 294 (2007) (“Time and again, initiatives are used to 
disadvantage minorities: racial minorities, language minorities, sexual 
orientation minorities, political minorities.”); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of 
Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1507–08 (1990) (explaining the tension 
that exists between direct democracy and judicial review); Hans A. Linde, When 
Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican Government”: The Campaign Against 
Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 19–20 (1993); Magleby, supra note 77, at 18 
(“[P]olitical reforms, like the initiative and popular referendum, do not always 
live up to the promises of their proponents, and the arguments for letting the 
voters decide need to be critically examined.”). 
 87. See Kafker & Russcol, supra note 64, at 1285–86 (arguing that the 
initiative process is unlikely to be abolished or restricted despite criticism).  
 88. Cf. Magleby, supra note 77, at 42–43 (“The United States is one of only 
five democracies which has never held a national referendum, but interest in a 
national initiative grew during the 1970s . . . .”). 
 89. See U.S. CONST. art. V (providing the means by which the Constitution 
can be amended); Eule, supra note 86, at 1529 (explaining that “[t]he people 
would enjoy no direct role under Article V”). 
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No. 63: “[T]here are particular moments in public affairs when 
the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit 
advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of 
interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will 
afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn.”90 Other 
Framers, such as Edmund Randolph and Elbridge Gerry, were 
even more damning, referring to the “follies of democracy” and 
calling popular rule “the worst of all political evils.”91 
Despite the Framers’ concerns about direct democracy, the 
state initiative process has survived federal constitutional 
challenges for over a century.92 In Pacific States Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,93 the Court rejected a challenge claiming 
that the initiative was inconsistent with the Constitution’s 
guarantee that states have a “Republican Form of Government,” 
holding instead that the enforcement of this provision was a 
political question for Congress.94 As a result, direct democracy in 
the states in the form of the initiative does not in and of itself 
violate the federal Constitution.95 
Direct democracy’s role in the federal system remains, 
however, a source of significant contention. As one scholar has 
noted: “In order for the federal constitutional dialogue to work, its 
debate over rights must include the voices of people. One of the 
great contributions of state constitutions to our system is the 
place they provide for these voices.”96 The initiative’s critics, 
                                                                                                     
 90. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 384 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
 91. Eule, supra note 86, at 1523 n.79. 
 92. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013) (noting 
“California’s sovereign right to maintain an initiative process”); id. at 2675 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The essence of democracy is that the right to make 
law rests in the people and flows to the government . . . . Freedom resides first 
in the people without need of a grant from government. The California initiative 
process embodies these principles and has done so for over a century.”). 
 93. 223 U.S. 118 (1912). 
 94. See id. at 141–43, 149–51. 
 95. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (“Nor do we question California’s 
sovereign right to maintain an initiative process . . . .”); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 223 U.S. at 149–51. But see Chemerinsky, supra note 86, at 301–04 
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s resolution of the issue is incorrect); Linde, 
supra note 86, at 20–21 (discussing the independent obligation of state courts 
and officials to enforce the Republican Government clause). 
 96. Harry L. Witte, Rights, Revolution, and the Paradox of 
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however, consider it out of place in Madison’s deliberative 
republic.97 The Hollingsworth majority made no effort to account 
for or accommodate the initiative’s distinct attributes, allowing it 
to sink or swim like a state fresh-water fish swimming in a 
federal salt-water sea.98 
There is, nonetheless, one great commonality of state and 
federal experience with the initiative process: initiative petitions 
generate an enormous amount of litigation in both the state and 
federal courts.99 As the dissenters in Hollingsworth explained, 
“185 of the 455 initiatives approved in Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Oregon, and Washington between 1900 and 2008 were 
challenged in court.”100 State and federal legal challenges are the 
rule, not the exception.101 As explained above, the initiatives 
address controversial and important social issues that engage the 
passions of advocacy groups; when these advocacy groups are 
defeated at the polls, their litigators can be expected to raise 
numerous state and federal constitutional questions in court.102  
The initiative provisions in state constitutions contain 
stringent limitations and procedures.103 These constitutional 
controls reflect decisions by the framers of the state constitutions 
and the people themselves that the initiative process must be 
                                                                                                     
Constitutionalism: The Processes of Constitutional Change in Pennsylvania, 3 
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 383, 475 (1993). 
 97. See Linde, supra note 86, at 23–24, 32–34 (providing Madison’s 
explanation of republican government and its benefits over popular democracy). 
 98. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2013) (“[O]nce 
Proposition 8 was approved by the voters, the measure became ‘a duly enacted 
constitutional amendment or statute’ . . . [and] [p]etitioners have no role—
special or otherwise—in the enforcement of Proposition 8.”). 
 99. See MILLER, supra note 75, at 104–12 (providing initiative litigation 
data from the 1900s to the 1990s for the five strongest initiative states). 
 100. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2671 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(citing MILLER, supra note 75, at 106). 
 101. See MILLER, supra note 75, at 104–05 (noting the “remarkable level of 
litigation” that has arisen in response to initiatives). 
 102. See id. at 108–09, 115–22 (explaining the controversial nature of many 
initiatives and the issues opponents bring before courts when challenging these 
initiatives). 
 103. See Kafker & Russcol, supra note 64, at 1287–88, 1290–94, 1306, 1310–
14 (explaining procedural and subject matter limitations in the initiative 
process as well as single subject limitations). 
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properly channeled.104 There are numerous legal requirements—
including signature counts, accurate and impartial ballot 
summaries, and single-subject limitations—that are designed to 
ensure that initiatives have the necessary support to be placed on 
the ballot and voters can make informed choices on 
comprehensible proposals.105 Some initiative provisions also 
exclude certain subject matter from the initiative process, such as 
freedom of religion and the independence of courts, 
acknowledging that certain rights are not appropriately 
addressed by direct democracy initiatives.106 
The state judiciary has not shied away from deciding the 
legal issues raised in the initiative process, despite the inherently 
political nature of the process itself.107 State courts have actively 
enforced the numerous initiative requirements, recognizing their 
role and responsibility as ultimate guardians of the people’s right 
to initiate statutory and constitutional change within the existing 
state constitutional order.108 They have recognized that at the 
pre-election stage they are tasked with resolving legal disputes 
among the proponents, opponents, and government actors 
involved in the implementation of the initiative.109 Although not 
                                                                                                     
 104. See id. at 1287–88 (“These requirements and limitations reflect 
decisions by the framers of the state constitutions and the people themselves 
that certain procedures must be followed to ensure that the initiative process 
functions as it was designed.”). 
 105. See id. at 1290–92, 1306–07 (explaining some of the legal requirements 
states have imposed on their initiative process and the purposes of these 
constraints); cf. James D. Gordon III & David B. Magleby, Pre-Election Judicial 
Review of Initiatives and Referendum, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 298, 315–16 
(1989). 
 106. See Kafker & Russcol, supra note 64, at 1313 (“Article 48 of the 
Massachusetts Constitution precludes initiative provisions related to freedom of 
religion, religious practices, or religious institutions, and those related to 
judicial appointment, tenure and compensation, or the reversal of a particular 
judicial decision.”). 
 107. See MILLER, supra note 75, at 101–04 (explaining the judiciary’s 
involvement in different aspects of the initiative process); Kafker & Russcol, 
supra note 64, at 1289 (“The state judiciary is the ultimate guardian of the 
procedural and substantive provisions of state constitutions, including the 
initiative provisions.”). 
 108. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 109. Gordon & Magleby, supra note 105, at 315; Kafker & Russcol, supra 
note 64, at 1289. 
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the final authority on federal constitutional questions, they must 
often address those issues as well.110  
Although the federal courts have very rarely taken up pre-
election disputes, they are active participants in the initiative 
process once a proposal has passed.111 They have had a prominent 
role in striking down discriminatory initiatives.112 For example, 
the Supreme Court has overturned initiatives driven by anti-gay 
bias and racial prejudice.113 Federal courts have also overturned 
initiatives violating First Amendment rights,114 the due process 
and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,115 and rights of criminal defendants such as the 
                                                                                                     
 110. See Kafker & Russcol, supra note 64, at 1289 (“The state judiciary 
cannot therefore just leave federal constitutional problems in the initiative 
process to the federal judiciary. At the same time, they are not the ultimate 
expositors of the meaning of the federal Constitution.”). 
 111. See MILLER, supra note 75, at 109–11 (summarizing federal court 
involvement in initiative litigation); Gordon & Magleby, supra note 105, at 304–
11, 319 (“Arguably, pre-election review of a measure’s substantive validity 
involves issuing an advisory opinion, violates ripeness requirements and the 
policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional questions, and is an unwarranted 
judicial intrusion into a legislative process.”); Craig B. Holman & Robert Stern, 
Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing Role of State and Federal 
Courts, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1239, 1250–59 (1997) (illustrating increased federal 
court involvement in California post-election initiative challenges). 
 112. See MILLER, supra note 75, at 115–17 (illustrating how the Equal 
Protection Clause was the second most common reason for courts invalidating 
initiatives). 
 113. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (concluding that a 
Colorado initiative was unconstitutional because it attempted to make 
homosexuals “unequal to everyone else”); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 
380–81 (1967) (affirming the invalidation of a California initiative because it 
authorized “racial discrimination in the housing market”). 
 114. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000) 
(finding that a California initiative mandating a blanket primary, in which each 
voter’s ballot includes every candidate regardless of party affiliation, violated 
political parties’ First Amendment right of association); Epperson v. Arkansas, 
393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (finding an Arkansas initiative that prohibited the 
teaching of evolution in state schools to be a violation of First Amendment). 
 115. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948) (finding that 
the “Alien Land Law denies ineligible aliens the equal protection of the laws, 
and that failure to apply any limitations period to escheat actions under that 
law takes property without due process of law”); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of 
the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535–36 (1925) (finding an 
Oregon initiative requiring all children to attend public schools violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment ). 
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right to remain silent.116 Federal courts have rejected numerous 
challenges as well.117 
Standing rules, of course, govern who can engage in these 
numerous disputes and in what capacity they can participate.118 
Standing may also determine at what stage and in what court—
trial or appellate, federal or state—the winner may be 
determined, and, finally, who that winner may be regardless of 
the ultimate merits.119 Given the importance of what is at stake 
in the initiative process, these standing rules matter 
considerably. As will be discussed below, the state and federal 
courts’ decisions on standing reflect not just their conception of 
the principles of justiciability, but also the purpose and place of 
the initiative process in their respective constitutional schemes. 
IV. Standing in State Court 
A. General Principles 
Standing in state courts is governed by a different set of 
constraints and considerations than those limiting and guiding 
the federal courts. First and foremost, the states are not bound by 
Article III.120 This is true regardless of whether the state court is 
considering a state or federal question.121 This is particularly 
                                                                                                     
 116. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (“We . . . hold that the 
Fifth Amendment . . . forbids either comment by the prosecution on the 
accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of 
guilt.”). 
 117. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 
U.S. 442, 454 (2008) (denying facial challenge to Washington initiative 
modifying primary voting system); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76–77 
(2003) (rejecting claim that state sentence under California’s Career Criminal 
Punishment Act was a constitutional violation); Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of L.A., 
458 U.S. 527, 545 (1982) (rejecting claim that voter initiative reducing busing of 
minority students was constitutional violation); Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843, 
847 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that California initiative limiting terms for state 
legislators was not constitutional violation). 
 118. Supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
 119. Supra notes 31–76 and accompanying text. 
 120. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have 
recognized often that the constraints of Article III do not apply to state 
courts . . . .”). 
 121. See id. (“[T]he state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or 
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important because most state constitutions do not contain 
standing provisions comparable to Article III’s case and 
controversy requirement.122 And given that state constitutions 
are more readily amended, including by the initiative in eighteen 
states,123 general principles of standing can be relaxed or altered 
when necessary.124 
Although state courts tend to be attuned to separation of 
powers concerns, they have generally upheld standing whenever 
the legislature or initiative process has provided for it.125 State 
judges typically have not found a state constitutional standing 
requirement, injury in fact or otherwise, that overrides a grant of 
standing by the legislature or by the people acting through the 
initiative.126 Thus, at least when statutes authorize private 
                                                                                                     
controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they address issues 
of federal law, as when they are called upon to interpret the Constitution or, in 
this case, a federal statute.”). 
 122. See, e.g., Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 
686, 693–94 (Mich. 2010) (explaining the standing requirements in Michigan’s 
constitution and their differences from federal standing requirements); Kellas v. 
Dep’t of Corr., 145 P.3d 139, 142–43 (Or. 2006) (“The Oregon Constitution 
contains no ‘cases’ or ‘controversies’ provision.”); cf. Grossman v. Dean, 80 P.3d 
952, 959 (Colo. App. 2003) (“Although federal decisions may be considered for 
guidance, we are ultimately governed here by state principles of standing, 
rather than the federal principles created by Article III of the United States 
Constitution . . . .”); Dep’t of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla. 
1994) (“[T]he doctrine of standing certainly exists in Florida, but not in the rigid 
sense employed in the federal system.”). 
 123. See WATERS, supra note 56, at 12 (noting that eighteen states allow 
constitutional amendment initiatives). 
 124. See Waterford Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 296 N.W.2d 328, 330–31 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (applying initiative amendment that went beyond common 
law and statutes in expanding standing in taxpayer actions). 
 125. See, e.g., Missourians to Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 
S.W.2d 824, 829 (Mo. 1990) (“The statute authorizing injunctive relief permits 
‘any citizen’ to bring the action. . . . Plaintiffs are not required to show any 
particular harm.”); City of Middletown v. Ferguson, 495 N.E.2d 380, 384 (Ohio 
1986) (“Appellants claim the city has no standing because its rights have not 
been adversely affected by the ordinance. . . . We believe that appellants have 
overlooked the fact that standing may also be conferred by statute.”); Ellis v. 
Roberts, 725 P.2d 886, 889 (Or. 1986) (applying standing statute written so 
broadly that “any registered voter—and probably others,” over a million people, 
would have standing). 
 126. See, e.g., Waterford Sch. Dist., 296 N.W.2d at 330–31 (upholding 
initiative meant to lessen standing requirement in taxpayer suits); City of 
Middletown, 495 N.E.2d at 384 (upholding statutory grant of standing to 
challenge initiative). 
STANDING AT A CONSTITUTIONAL DIVIDE 253 
enforcement of public rights by taxpayers, citizens, or private 
attorneys general, state courts have permitted such actions to 
proceed.127 Those states that have enforced injury in fact 
requirements comparable to Article III have usually done so in 
the absence of express legislative provisions for standing.128 
Finally, the state courts have retained the authority to overlook 
standing problems in unusual cases, which arise frequently in the 
initiative context.129 
The state courts in initiative states combine these standing 
principles with a firm commitment to carrying out the 
fundamental purpose of the initiative process.130 These courts 
protect the people’s right to use that process to direct statutory 
and constitutional change in the face of government indifference 
or opposition.131 They have not left the defense of initiative 
                                                                                                     
 127. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526a (West 2013) (recognizing 
taxpayer standing); Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 17 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001) (“In particular, there are two related rules of standing applicable in 
state court actions that are contrary to the rules in federal court—the right to 
maintain an action as a taxpayer . . . and the right to maintain an action as a 
citizen.”); Colo. State Civil Serv. Emp. Ass’n v. Love, 448 P.2d 624, 627 (Colo. 
1968) (holding that petitioners, as taxpayers, had standing to “challenge 
statutory provisions which involve reorganization of [Colorado’s] state 
government”). See generally John DiManno, Note, Beyond Taxpayers’ Suits: 
Public Interest Standing in the States, 41 CONN. L. REV. 639 (2008).  
 128. Cf. City of Middletown, 495 N.E.2d at 384 (“Where the party does not 
rely on any specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process, the 
question of standing depends on whether the party has alleged a personal stake 
in the outcome . . . .”). 
 129. See, e.g., Grossman v. Dean, 80 P.3d 952, 959 (Colo. App. 2003) (finding 
that plaintiff, as House Minority Leader and sponsor of the bill in question, had 
standing to pursue action for declaratory judgment with respect to that bill); 
State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1081 
(Ohio 1999) (noting that federal standing analysis applies in “the vast majority 
of cases” but that “the federal decisions in this area are not binding upon this 
court, and we are free to dispense with the requirement for injury where the 
public interest so demands”). 
 130. See, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1024 (Cal. 2011) 
(“[P]articipation by the official initiative proponents enhances both the 
substantive fairness and completeness of the judicial evaluation of the 
initiative’s validity and the appearance of procedural fairness that is essential if 
a court decision adjudicating the validity of a voter-approved initiative measure 
is to be perceived as legitimate . . . .”). 
 131. See id. (explaining that standing for the official proponents of an 
initiative “often is essential to ensure that the interests and perspective of the 
voters who approved the measure are not consciously or unconsciously 
subordinated to other public interests that may be championed by elected 
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statutes to government officials alone, even in the absence of 
express provisions regarding the defense of initiatives after 
passage.132 
B. Standing in the Initiative Process: Pre-election Standing 
Expressly Provided by Statute 
The laws governing the initiative process in each state often 
anticipate challenges by proponents and opponents of the 
initiative, providing guidance on where, when, and by whom such 
challenges may be brought.133 Other states rely on generally 
applicable election statutes, alone or in combination with 
initiative-specific provisions, to define standing regarding 
initiatives.134 Where standing is expressly provided either to 
                                                                                                     
officials”). 
 132. See Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 3 P.3d 906, 912–14 
(Alaska 2000) (determining that proponents of initiative had standing because 
“when the people of a state have reserved the power of direct legislation, those 
who take responsibility for that direct legislation may have a sufficient interest” 
to satisfy standing requirements). See also Perry, 265 P.3d at 1018 
[S]ince the adoption of the initiative power a century ago, decisions of both 
this court and the Courts of Appeal have repeatedly and uniformly 
permitted the official proponents of initiative measures to participate as 
parties . . . in both preelection and postelection litigation challenging the 
initiative measure they have sponsored. 
Sportsmen for I-143 v. Mont. Fifteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 40 P.3d 400, 403 
(Mont. 2002) (“[T]he Sportsmen’s Groups were the authors, sponsors, active 
supporters and defenders of I-143. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
Sportsmen’s Groups have a direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in 
the instant action challenging the interpretation of I-143, and, as such, they are 
entitled to intervene as a matter of right.”). 
 133. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-921, 19-122 (2013) (providing 
standing to proponents of ballot initiatives in both post-election and pre-election 
actions); MO. REV. STAT. § 116.200 (2013) (providing “any citizen” standing to 
challenge, in Cole County court, secretary of state’s certification of initiative 
petition as valid or invalid); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 32-1410(3), 32-1412 (2012) 
(providing that “any resident” can challenge, in Lancaster County, a refusal by 
the secretary of state to place an initiative on the ballot); OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, 
§§ 8, 10, 18 (2013) (setting out process for ballot initiatives and providing that if 
any state official has failed to perform a duty in relation to the initiative 
process, “any elector may petition the district court, without cost to him, where 
any such officer has his official residence”). 
 134. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.479 (2013) (providing standing to 
“[a]ny person or persons, feeling themselves aggrieved”); OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 246.910, 250.044, 250.085, 250.131 (2013) (providing broad standing 
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proponents or to any voter, person, or citizen, the courts have 
generally135 steadfastly respected the grant of standing.136 This is 
consistent with the state courts’ respectful deference to the 
                                                                                                     
requirements for election challenges, such as any “person adversely affected” 
and “[a]ny elector dissatisfied with a ballot title”). 
 135. We are aware of only one state, Idaho, where the courts have refused to 
accept a legislative grant of standing in pre-election litigation. See Noh v. 
Cenarrusa, 53 P.3d 1217, 1218–19 (Idaho 2002) (denying petitioners’ pre-
election initiative challenge for lack of standing despite legislative grant to “any 
qualified elector”). However, although the Noh case discussed standing, later 
cases made clear that the Idaho Supreme Court was motivated by an overriding 
concern for having the people’s voices heard at the ballot box before the courts 
would intervene. See City of Boise v. Keep the Commandments Coal., 141 P.3d 
1123, 1125–26 (Idaho 2006) (finding that allowing pre-election challenge to 
ballot initiative “may prevent the voters from articulating a view by the ballot 
that could be instructive to the legislative authority, whichever way the votes 
are cast”); Davidson v. Wright, 151 P.3d 812, 816–17 (Idaho 2006) (explaining 
that pre-election challenges to ballot initiatives are only appropriate when “the 
procedures for placing the initiative on the ballot were not followed”). The core 
holding of Noh and its progeny was therefore based on ripeness—a concern for 
when a case would be heard rather than who could bring it. See Noh, 53 P.3d at 
1219, 1222 (concluding that, before an initiative was voted on, “[a]ny injury 
suffered is speculative” and that there would be a “justiciable controversy” only 
“if the initiative passes”). Two years earlier, the same court had stretched to find 
voter standing in a post-election challenge to a term limits initiative, holding 
that the opponents had demonstrated a distinct injury “different from the injury 
suffered by any other Idaho citizen” because the term limit provision “adversely 
impacts only those registered voters who oppose the term limits pledge,” while 
supporters of term limits were not injured. Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for 
Term Limits, 15 P.3d 1129, 1133 (Idaho 2000). That court continues to cite Van 
Valkenburgh as good law. See Wasden v. State Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 280 P.3d 
693, 697 (Idaho 2012) (citing Van Valkenburgh to explain Idaho’s standing 
doctrine). 
 136. See, e.g., In re Proposed Initiative Measure No. 20, 774 So. 2d 397, 402 
(Miss. 2000) (“As qualified electors and taxpayers of the State of Mississippi, the 
appellees in this case had standing to assert their claims questioning the 
sufficiency of Initiative Measure No. 20.”), overruled on other grounds by Speed 
v. Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1278 (Miss. 2011); Missourians to Protect the Initiative 
Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824, 829 (Mo. 1990) (“The statute authorizing 
injunctive relief permits ‘any citizen’ to bring the action. . . . Plaintiffs are not 
required to show any particular harm.”); State ex rel. Wenzel v. Murray, 585 
P.2d 633, 638 (Mont. 1978) (“The relator as a taxpayer, property owner and 
elector, has standing to sue to prevent the waste of public monies . . . .”); Ellis v. 
Roberts, 725 P.2d 886, 889 (Or. 1986) (“[The statute] requires only that a person 
be ‘adversely affected’ before he can bring an action challenging an election 
ruling of the Secretary of State. In effect, this means that any registered voter—
and probably others, as well—can file an action.”). But cf. In re Initiative 
Petition No. 363, 927 P.2d 558, 565 (Okla. 1996) (mentioning standing issues in 
discussion noting lack of justiciability of particular substantive claims).  
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legislative standing provisions in other areas, including those 
allowing taxpayer or private attorney general suits.137  
This deference to the legislature is considered consistent 
with, and not contrary to, the separation of powers, as the 
legislature has expressly provided for legal challenges and 
determined who has standing to bring those challenges.138 On the 
state side, deference to the legislature’s broad authorization of 
standing is not considered as interfering with executive branch 
decision-making; this heightened federal concern, discussed in 
Part V, is foreign to state standing law.139 Also, unlike federal 
courts, which have limited jurisdiction only as permitted by 
Article III, state courts have general jurisdiction unless otherwise 
limited.140 Finally, these generous statutory standing rules allow 
the people to participate as fully as possible in the people’s 
process for initiating legislative or constitutional change. 
C. Pre-election Standing for Proponents Absent Express Standing 
Provision 
In many states, nothing in the state constitution or laws 
explicitly confers standing for pre-election disputes, even for 
petitioners.141 Prior to passage, however, they are the primary 
                                                                                                     
 137. Cf. Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 
74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1277–78 (1961) (explaining the history of the taxpayer 
suit and the recent judicial trend of “favoring them”); Stephen L. Winter, The 
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
1371, 1406–07 (1988) (describing the historical significance of standing 
doctrines that provide general standing to the population in order to further a 
particular policy goal).  
 138. See supra note 136. 
 139. Infra Part V. 
 140. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–52 (1984); Dep’t of Revenue 
v. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla. 1994) (“Florida’s circuit courts . . . have 
authority over any matter not expressly denied them by the constitution or 
applicable statutes. Accordingly, the doctrine of standing certainly exists in 
Florida, but not in the rigid sense employed in the federal system.”); State ex rel. 
Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1081 (Ohio 1999) 
(“[T]he federal decisions in this area are not binding upon this court, and we are 
free to dispense with the requirement for injury where the public interest so 
demands.”). 
 141. For instance, in Nevada, the statute governing initiative challenges is 
written in the passive voice, stating when and in what courts initiatives “may be 
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actors in the initiative process, asserting their statutory and 
constitutional rights to propel the process forward.142 They 
therefore have special authority concerning the initiative,143 an 
authority that must include defending the initiative against legal 
challenge while the pre-election process plays out. Their full 
participation is particularly necessary in the face of government 
indifference and opposition, which are expected parts of the 
initiative process.144 Their standing rights in the early stages are 
necessarily implied by the very structure of the initiative process 
itself, even in the absence of express statutory standing.145 Given 
their defined role as parties to the initiative process, there is 
universal recognition, at least pre-election, that they have 
standing whenever judicial review is permitted.146 Even the 
Roberts majority does not seem to doubt proponents’ special role 
and concrete pre-election interest in defending the initiative.147 
                                                                                                     
challenged,” but not specifying who may bring such challenges. NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 295.061 (2012). The Nevada Supreme Court has applied the provision broadly, 
entertaining challenges by “interested persons and Nevada registered voters,” 
Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 245 P.3d 572, 573 (Nev. 2010); “numerous business 
entities,” Rogers v. Heller, 18 P.3d 1034, 1036 (Nev. 2001); and a “political action 
committee,” Educ. Initiative PAC v. Comm. to Protect Nev. Jobs, 293 P.3d 874, 
877 (Nev. 2013).  
 142. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1016 (Cal. 2011). 
 143. See, e.g., MASS CONST. art. LXXXI, § 3 (stating that proponents may 
make limited amendments to initiatives in some circumstances); CAL. ELEC. 
CODE § 9032 (West 2013) (providing that only proponents may file petitions); id. 
§ 9067 (providing that proponents have priority in submitting arguments for 
voter guide); OR. REV. STAT. § 250.045(5) (2013) (providing that the “chief 
petitioner” may amend the initiative in certain circumstances). 
 144. See MILLER, supra note 75, at 23–28; Kafker & Russcol, supra note 64, 
at 1283, 1300–03 (describing an “unresponsive government” and an 
intentionally noncompliant legislature as expected parts of the initiative 
system). 
 145. Perry, 265 P.3d at 1020–21, 1023–24. 
 146. Cf. id. at 1017 (referencing the relevant sections of the California 
Elections Code, which grant to the official proponents myriad powers and 
responsibilities). 
 147. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2012) (confirming 
that petitioners were “official proponents” entitled to the exclusive right to file 
an initiative with election officials and to control arguments that would appear 
in ballot pamphlets in favor of the initiative). 
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D. Pre-election Standing for Other Supporters 
Supporters who are not official proponents fall into a 
different category. Absent express statutory recognition, it is not 
clear why they should have standing or the mandatory right to 
intervene.148 They have not accepted or been granted the official 
responsibilities or authority of petitioners.149 Proponents should 
have the necessary constitutional or statutory status, as well as 
the knowledge and incentives, to defend the initiative, with or 
without the assistance of other supporters.150 Allowing standing 
for all supporters creates a danger of a chaotic cacophony of 
litigants.151 Absent legislative requirements to that effect, such 
indiscriminate standing should be avoided. 
Instead, the standards of permissive intervention allow the 
courts to ensure all voices are heard within a manageable 
process.152 The rules governing such intervention are often 
similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b), which allows 
“anyone” to intervene in an action if he or she “has a claim or 
defense that shares with the main action a common question of 
law or fact.”153 The court, however, has discretion to allow or deny 
intervention and specifically may balance a would-be intervenor’s 
interests against the potential for delay or prejudice to the rights 
of the parties.154 This discretion enables the court to allow a 
                                                                                                     
 148. See Alaskans for a Common Language v. Kritz, 3 P.3d 906, 916 (Alaska 
2000) (denying that nonofficial proponents have any interest “greater than a 
generalized interest of a political nature”).  
 149. See id. at 914 (“The record fails to show . . . that [unofficial proponent’s] 
directors, officers, or incorporators were sponsors of the initiative . . . .”). 
 150. See id. at 912–14 (discussing the “sufficient interest” that proponents 
must have to justify intervention); Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1022, 1022–24 (Cal. 
2011) (same). 
 151. See Alaskans for a Common Language, 3 P.3d at 914, 916 (warning 
against the procedural difficulties of considering every point of view offered by 
the “interested” public).  
 152. See id. at 916 (implying that the absence of such standards may invite 
“undue delay and prejudice”). 
 153. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B); see also, e.g., Alaskans for a Common 
Language, 3 P.3d at 916 n.45 (“[A]ny person who has an interest in the matter 
in litigation may, by leave of court, intervene.” (citing ALASKA CIV. R. 24(b))); OR. 
R. CIV. P. 33(B)). 
 154. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(3) (“In exercising its discretion, the court must 
consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 
adjudication . . . .”). 
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range of participation: when supporters would add something 
material to the proceedings, they may be made parties by 
intervention; otherwise, they may be limited to providing 
assistance to the existing parties or to filing amicus briefs.155 The 
proponents, opponents, and government officials together ensure 
robust advocacy and a justiciable controversy. To the extent that 
the court finds other supporters’ voices relevant or helpful, they 
may be heard as well.156 In the absence of a statute or 
constitutional provision to the contrary, it is not critical to the 
initiative process that supporters be given a greater right to join 
in the proceedings beyond permissive intervention. 
E. Pre-Election Standing of Opponents 
Generally, the standing of opponents is defined broadly by 
statute.157 Although their rights may differ statutorily from 
proponents,158 they also have an important role in ensuring that 
government officials perform their numerous responsibilities 
overseeing the initiative process—including reviewing signature 
counts, providing fair and impartial ballot summaries, and 
excluding initiatives regarding prohibited subject matter.159 As 
the initiative process is guided by the idea that government 
officials cannot always be relied on to do the people’s business, 
opponents must have an ability to force government action as 
                                                                                                     
 155. See Alaskans for a Common Language v. Kritz, 3 P.3d 906, 916 (Alaska 
2000) (“We recognize that ‘additional parties are always the source of additional 
questions, briefs, objections, arguments and motions, [and] where no new issues 
are presented, the most effective and expeditious way to participate is by a brief 
amicus curiae and not by intervention.’” (quoting State v. Weidner, 684 P.2d 
103, 114 (Alaska 1984))). 
 156. State v. Weidner, 684 P.2d 103, 114 (Alaska 1984). 
 157. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-17-13 (2013) (asserting that “any 
person” may appeal ballot title and summary); MO. REV. STAT. §116.200(1) 
(2012) (asserting that “any citizen” can challenge sufficiency or insufficiency of 
petition); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1412(1)–(2) (2012) (using “any resident”); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 34, § 8(B) (2013) (using “any citizen or citizens of the state”). 
 158. See Schrempp v. Munro, 809 P.2d 1381, 1384–85 (Wash. 1991) 
(discussing differing rights of proponents and opponents in the initiative 
process). 
 159. Cf. Kafker & Russcol, supra note 64, at 1294–1316 (discussing 
government officials’ responsibilities during the initiative process). 
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well.160 Accordingly, mandamus and similar proceedings allow 
opponents to bring legal issues before the courts pre-election in 
many states.161 Mandamus itself applies when executive officials 
fail to perform express ministerial responsibilities,162 but some 
states have provided for more robust judicial review of particular 
decisions, such as the wording of ballot titles and summaries.163 
In these areas, officials may have room to impact the voters’ 
reception of an initiative, but the state courts act to ensure that 
the officials do not improperly influence the result by misleading 
the electorate.164 Even if courts require some showing of injury for 
opponent standing, they apply the principle much more liberally 
than federal courts. State courts have diminished standing 
requirements for opponents by finding an injury to individual 
voters in avoiding misleading or illegal uses of the initiative, or 
an interest by individual taxpayers in avoiding the expenditure of 
tax money on holding an election for a potentially invalid 
measure.165 Thus, to the extent that state courts will hear pre-
                                                                                                     
 160. See Miller, supra note 77, at 1039–44 (asserting the importance of the 
opponents to an initiative’s voices). 
 161. See, e.g., McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 788–90 (Cal. 1948) (“[T]he 
measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until . . . the writ [of 
mandamus] sought by the petitioner should issue. Mandamus is a proper 
remedy.”). 
 162. See Jeremy Zeitlin, Note, Whose Constitution Is It Anyway? The 
Executives’ Discretion to Defend Initiatives Amending the California 
Constitution, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 327, 336 (2011) (“Indeed the most 
venerable of all American opinions, Marbury v. Madison, held that a court may 
only issue a writ of mandamus to compel action . . . .”). 
 163. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-107 (2013) (“If the motion claims that 
the title and submission clause set by the title board are unfair . . . .”). 
 164. See Josh Goodman, Fate of Ballot Measures Often Depends on the 
Wording, STATELINE (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.pewstates.org/projects/ 
stateline/headlines/fate-of-ballot-measures-often-depends-on-the-wording-85899 
377387 (last visited Aug. 21, 2013) (discussing numerous examples of state 
legislatures creating misleading wording in an effort to affect the outcome of the 
initiative’s vote) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also 
Fairness & Accountability in Ins. Reform v. Greene, 886 P.2d 1338, 1346–49 
(Ariz. 1994) (distinguishing between a truly neutral explanation of an initiative 
on the ballot and an explanation that is “fair” but nonetheless argumentative); 
Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351, 1355 (Fla. 1984) (holding that ballot 
summary that addresses only one of three included provisions is “fatally 
misleading”); In re Initiative Petition No. 360, 879 P.2d 810, 820 (Okla. 1994) 
(holding that ballot title was misleading and thus in error). 
 165. See, e.g., Tax Equity Alliance for Mass. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 516 N.E. 
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election challenges to initiatives,166 they typically impose as few 
restrictions on standing for opponents as they impose on 
proponents.167 Standing has been generously, and we believe 
appropriately, allowed to ensure a level playing field in the 
initiative process. 
F. Post-Election Standing for Petitioners 
As explained above, Article III requirements do not apply to 
state courts.168 There is more deference to the legislature, a 
greater willingness to authorize private enforcement of public 
rights, and almost no tendency to treat injury in fact 
requirements as the overriding consideration.169 So how should 
these state standing principles apply post-election? 
Although express provisions addressing post-passage defense 
of initiatives—particularly who can step in when the government 
declines to defend an initiative—have not generally been included 
in the state laws governing initiatives prior to Hollingsworth,170 
they should be included prospectively for a number of reasons. 
First and foremost, without such provisions, proponents are 
                                                                                                     
2d 152, 154–55 (Mass. 1987) (“Certainly the individual plaintiffs as citizens and 
qualified voters have standing to raise a challenge to the use of the initiative 
process.”); State ex rel. Wenzel v. Murray, 585 P.2d 633, 638 (Mont. 1978) (“The 
relator as a taxpayer, property owner and elector, has standing to sue to prevent 
the waste of public monies . . . .”). 
 166. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 105, at 302–17 (discussing 
parameters and limitations of appropriate pre-election review). 
 167. See supra note 157. 
 168. See supra Part IV.A. 
 169. See supra Part IV.A–B (delineating the restrictions and freedoms facing 
state courts in hearing initiative challenges). 
 170. But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-921(A) (2013) (explicitly conferring 
standing and a right to intervene on official initiative proponents). This statute 
was passed as a response to the emergence of the standing issue in the 
Proposition 8 litigation. See CTR. FOR ARIZ. POLICY, FAMILY ISSUE FACT SHEET: 
NO. 2012-05 (Jan. 2012), http://blog.azpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/f12-05-
RightofIntervention-Initiative-Referendum.pdf (confirming that Arizona Section 
12-921(A) was proposed and passed as a direct response to the California 
situation created by Proposition 8). At least one initiative has also explicitly 
granted standing to proponents. See Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term 
Limits, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (Idaho 2000) (interpreting initiative petition that 
explicitly conferred standing on proponents). 
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unlikely to satisfy strict Article III standing requirements in 
federal court if state officials ordinarily expected to defend the 
state’s laws decide to drop the defense.171 Second, under state 
constitutional law, there is great deference to express 
authorization of standing,172 so post-passage defense provisions 
should be respected by the state courts. Third, it is not an 
unexpected problem for government officials to decline to defend 
controversial initiatives.173 There is no reason not to anticipate 
and address the problem. 
If such post-election defense rights are not expressly 
provided, what rights should private parties, including 
proponents, have to defend an initiative in state courts? As 
explained by the California Supreme Court, proponents have a 
unique relationship to the initiative.174 They have proposed, 
funded, and defended the initiative against legal challenges.175 
They have successfully reached out to the people.176 They have 
often done so in the face of opposition or indifference from state 
officials.177 So what should their status be post-passage? We 
conclude, as have the few state courts to directly consider the 
issue, that they should at least have the right to intervene.178 We 
                                                                                                     
 171. See infra Part V (discussing proponents’ standing in federal court). 
 172. See supra Part IV.B. 
 173. See Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1005, 1022–23 (Cal. 2011) 
(referencing instances when government officials have declined to defend 
controversial initiatives); Zeitlin, supra note 162, at 340–43, 352–54 (same); see 
also Juliet Eilperin, State Officials Balk at Defending Laws They Deem 
Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (July 18, 2013), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/politics/state-officials-balk-at-defending-laws-they-deem-un 
constitutional/2013/07/18/14cf86ce-ee2b-11e2-9008-61e94a7ea20d_story.html 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (suggesting that officials are declining to defend 
controversial laws more frequently than ever before) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); cf. Maggie Clark, Attorneys General Prepare 
to Defend Controversial Laws, STATELINE (May 17, 2013), http://www.pewstates. 
org/projects/stateline/headlines/attorneys-general-prepare-to-defend-controver 
sial-laws-85899476891 (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (noting that legislators in 
Arkansas and Montana are considering bills that would provide the legislature 
with express standing rights when the attorney general declines to defend their 
state’s law in court) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 174. Perry, 265 P.3d at 1024. 
 175. Id. at 1015. 
 176. Id. at 1013. 
 177. Id. at 1008. 
 178. See id. at 1023–24 (giving proponents the right to intervene); Alaskans 
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also conclude that they should have standing to defend the 
initiative if the government declines to defend it. 
An excellent introduction into the issues regarding post-
passage intervention for petitioners appears in Alaskans for a 
Common Language v. Kritz,179 a case relied on by the California 
Supreme Court and the dissenters in Hollingsworth.180 According 
to Alaska’s initiative laws, an application must be signed by 100 
sponsors and include three sponsors to be designated an initiative 
committee to represent the sponsors and subscribers.181 In the 
Alaska case, two organizations, one of which (Alaskans for a 
Common Language) had been formed by sponsors of the initiative 
serving on the initiative committee, sought to intervene to defend 
the constitutionality of an initiative petition that had passed 
requiring the adoption of English as the official language in the 
state.182 Prior to passage of the initiative, the attorney general’s 
office had raised questions regarding the constitutionality of the 
initiative but recommended that the initiative be certified and 
placed on the ballot.183 After passage, the attorney general’s office 
agreed to defend the initiative.184 The Governor, who was a 
                                                                                                     
for a Common Language v. Kritz, 3 P.2d 906 (Alaska 2000) (same); Sportsmen 
for I-143 v. Mont. Fifteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 40 P.3d 400 (Mont. 2002) 
(same). 
 179. 3 P.3d 906 (Alaska 2000). 
 180. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2670 (2013) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1031–33 (Cal. 2011). 
 181. See Alaskans for a Common Language, 3 P.3d at 909 n.2 (citing to 
Article I of the Alaska Constitution and Section X of Alaska Statutes). 
 182. See id. at 909–10 (“After the superior court consolidated the two cases, 
Alaskans for a Common Language and U.S. English moved to intervene . . . .”). 
Because two members of the initiative committee were officers and members of 
Alaskans for a Common Language, the court treated the group as their 
representative rather than analyzing its standing in its own right. See id. at 
912–13, 915–16 n.43 (“Because we decide that Alaskans for a Common 
Language has a right to participate as a party to represent the interests of [two 
officers and members], we do not need to decide whether the organization, 
standing alone, could intervene to represent the broader interest of its Alaskan 
membership.”). 
 183. See id. at 909 (“[The Attorney General’s office] noted that . . . the 
proposed Alaska initiative [could be found] unconstitutional, but . . . concluded 
that the outcome was not so certain that certification should be denied.”). 
 184. Id. at 910.  
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named defendant, had personally and publicly opposed the 
measure, calling it “unnecessary, unfair and unfortunate.”185 
After a state trial court denied intervention to the two 
organizations, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed in part, 
concluding that the sponsors of the initiative, including Alaskans 
for a Common Language, had the right to intervene under 
Alaska’s rule regarding intervention as of right.186 According to 
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), intervention as of right 
shall be allowed  
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property 
or transaction which is the subject of the action and the 
applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may 
as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability 
to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is 
adequately represented by existing parties.187 
The Alaska rule tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 24(a).188 
The court reasoned that “[i]f the initiative were declared 
unconstitutional . . . the efforts of [the sponsors] . . . would be 
frustrated.”189 As those sponsors “used the process of direct 
legislation to enact a law that the executive branch questioned 
and opposed,” they also had legitimate reasons for “wanting to 
guarantee that the initiative is defended zealously” and “trying to 
ensure that the credibility of institutional arguments in favor of 
the initiative is not diminished by the previous comments from 
the executive branch.”190 The court also noted that the attorney 
                                                                                                     
 185. Id. 
 186. See id. at 916 (“Therefore, Alaskans for a Common Language meets the 
requirements for associational standing . . . .”). The court did, however, affirm 
the denial of intervention as to a national group that provided funding and 
support but was not a sponsor of the initiative, as the standards for permissive 
intervention applied to this decision, and the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion. Id. at 916. (“Because the superior court concluded that U.S. English 
failed to raise any new issues, we hold that the superior court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied U.S. English permissive intervention but allowed it to 
participate as an amicus curiae.”). 
 187. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 24(a). 
 188. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). 
 189. Alaskans for a Common Language v. Kritz, 3 P.3d 906, 913 (Alaska 
2000). 
 190. Id. at 914. 
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general’s office did not oppose intervention, recognizing that the 
sponsors “had an interest, that [they were] uniquely qualified to 
raise arguments about the intent of the initiative, and that [they] 
might offer a different perspective that should be heard by the 
court.”191 
The court also addressed the issue of adequate 
representation of interests, concluding that it would “presume 
that the Attorney General’s office would not fail to defend the 
constitutionality of the initiative energetically . . . and . . . that 
the governor would not interfere,” but finding that there was, 
nonetheless, a sufficient appearance of adversity on the part of 
the government to justify intervention on the part of the 
sponsors.192 The court explained: “Every strategic decision made 
by the Attorney General’s Office in defending the legislation 
might be publicly questioned and second-guessed by the 
initiative’s sympathizers. That this suspicion may be unfounded 
does not make it less inevitable.”193 The court concluded that “a 
sponsor’s direct interest in legislation enacted through the 
initiative process and the concomitant need to avoid the 
appearance of adversity will ordinarily preclude courts from 
denying intervention as of right to a sponsoring group.”194 A 
similar result, with less explicit analysis, was reached by the 
Montana Supreme Court in an analogous case.195 And the 
                                                                                                     
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See generally Sportsmen for I-143 v. Mont. Fifteenth Judicial Dist. 
Court, 40 P.3d 400 (Mont. 2002). The Montana initiative proposed a prohibition 
of the shooting of alternative livestock for a fee. Id. at 401. After passage of the 
initiative, alternative game farmers challenged the initiative, and the 
sportsmen’s groups, who were “the authors, sponsors, active supporters and 
defenders” of the initiative, sought intervention. Id. A district court denied 
intervention, concluding that the sportsmen’s groups “did not have a legally 
protectable interest in either the property (alternative livestock) or the lawful 
business transactions.” Id. at 402. The Montana Supreme Court reversed, 
summarily concluding that “the [s]portsmen’s [g]roups have a direct, 
substantial, legally protectable interest in the instant action . . . and, as such, 
they are entitled to intervene as a matter of right.” Id. at 402. The court also 
concluded that the sportsmen’s groups demonstrated that their interests were 
not adequately represented by an existing party, the Department of Fish, 
Wildlife and Parks. Id. at 402. The court simply concluded that the sportsmen’s 
groups “who actively drafted and supported [the initiative] may be in the best 
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California Supreme Court in its Proposition 8 decision, though 
not relying on intervention as of right, approved of the Alaska 
and Montana precedents and endorsed the California courts’ 
“uniform practice” of allowing proponents to participate as parties 
in litigation challenging initiatives.196 
We conclude that the intervention as of right approach 
adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court is well-considered and 
should be the default rule for proponents in state courts who seek 
to intervene to defend an initiative after its passage. Their 
extensive “efforts” as official sponsors, supporters, and defenders 
provide them with an interest in the initiative—an interest that, 
at least under state law, may be considered distinct from that of 
the general public and of other supporters, even after passage.197 
Although there is a presumption of adequate government 
representation, in the initiative context that presumption should 
be dispelled by even the appearance of adversity of interest by the 
government.198 The initiative process is driven too strongly by 
                                                                                                     
position to defend their interpretation of the resulting legislation.” Id. 
 196. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1023 (Cal. 2011). 
 197. See Alaskans for a Common Language v. Kritz, 3 P.3d 906, 913 (Alaska 
2000) (“This heightened, constitutionally based, and statutorily bolstered 
interest is a direct, substantial and significantly protectable interest.” (internal 
quotation and citation omitted)). It is unclear whether federal courts would 
consider this interest sufficient to justify intervention as of right because the 
courts have split on whether or not the bar for such intervention is identical to 
the injury requirement for Article III standing. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 
U.S. 54, 68 n.21 (1986) (“The Courts of Appeals have reached varying 
conclusions as to whether a party seeking to intervene as of right must himself 
possess standing.”); Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 955 n.8 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(describing the diverse positions the Courts of Appeals have taken on the 
standing issue). Federal courts do not consider this interest to rise to the level 
justifying independent standing under Article III. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662–63 (2013) (“We have repeatedly held that . . . a 
generalized grievance, no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer standing.” 
(internal quotation and citation omitted)). 
 198. See Alaskans for a Common Language, 3 P.3d at 913–14 
(“[Presumption of adequate government representation] may be rebutted and 
inadequate representation may be proved by a showing of collusion, adversity of 
interest, possible nonfeasance, or incompetence.”). As with the impartiality of 
courts, even the appearance of bias or conflict of interest undermines public 
confidence in the initiative process. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 
(1955) (“[T]o perform its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the 
appearance of justice.’” (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954))); 
Commonwealth v. Morgan RV Resorts, LLC, 992 N.E.2d 369, 375 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2013) (“In order to preserve and protect the integrity of the judiciary and the 
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concerns about the indifference and opposition of government 
officials to be left completely in those same hands to defend. 
Otherwise, the purpose of the initiative process, and the public’s 
confidence in government itself, is undermined. Finally, allowing 
intervention as of right by proponents recognizes that they bring 
distinct knowledge and different perspectives to bear about the 
initiative’s language and purpose, information which may be 
valuable to the court as it addresses the legal challenges.199 As 
the California Supreme Court stated, intervention by proponents 
finds support in numerous cases in which official initiative 
proponents advanced many of the most substantial legal 
theories that were raised in support of the challenged measure 
and were discussed in this court’s opinion . . . . These decisions 
highlight the different perspectives regarding the validity or 
proper interpretation of a voter-approved initiative measure 
often held by the official proponents of the initiative measure 
and by the voters who enacted the measure into law, as 
contrasted with those held by the elected officials who 
ordinarily defend challenged state laws.200 
We agree with these courts that, when state officials mount a 
defense, proponents should be permitted to intervene as of right. 
G. Standing for Petitioners If Government Officials Decline to 
Defend the Initiative 
The next issue is whether petitioner-proponents should have 
independent standing in state courts, in addition to the rights of 
an intervenor, when the government declines to defend the 
initiative either at trial or on appeal and there is no express 
provision in the initiative regarding who should defend it post-
                                                                                                     
judicial process, and the necessary public confidence in both, even the 
appearance of partiality must be avoided.”). See generally Leslie W. Abramson, 
Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality “Might 
Reasonably Be Questioned”, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55 (2000). Just as judges 
should recuse themselves whenever their impartiality is even open to question, 
courts should permit proponents to participate whenever there is any 
uncertainty whether the state will undertake a vigorous defense. 
 199. See Alaskans for a Common Language, 3 P.3d at 914 (“[Proponent] was 
uniquely qualified to raise arguments about the intent of the initiative, and it 
might offer a different perspective that should be heard by the court.”). 
 200. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1023–24 (Cal. 2011). 
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passage. Leaving aside Article III requirements, which bind only 
the federal courts and are discussed below, we conclude that in 
states that have adopted the initiative process, state 
constitutional law and standing principles should be understood 
to provide for such standing, even absent express authorization. 
The reasons why petitioner-proponents should have state 
court standing to defend initiatives post-passage are well 
articulated by the California Supreme Court and the dissenters 
in Hollingsworth and have been discussed previously in this 
Article,201 so they have been summarized only briefly here. 
Suffice it to say that the constitutionality of the people’s initiative 
is entitled to a defense, and the proponents are uniquely 
positioned to provide such a defense when state officials decline 
to do so.202 If state officials can determine the legality and effect 
of an initiative by refusing to defend or enforce it, the 
fundamental purpose of the initiative process to direct change 
opposed by government officials is defeated.203 The question then 
becomes whether there are other countervailing and overriding 
considerations in a particular state’s constitutional law that 
preclude petitioners from having standing.  
In our opinion, the answer depends on whether state courts 
impose their own injury in fact requirement in the absence of 
express statutory or constitutional authorization to sue. Among 
the most interesting and provocative discussions of this issue, 
outside of the initiative context, is Lansing Schools Education 
Association v. Lansing Board of Education.204 The issue presented 
was whether teachers had standing to sue a school board for 
failing to enforce a statutory duty to expel students who had 
physically assaulted the teachers.205 The statute did not explicitly 
provide the teachers with authority to sue.206 They nonetheless 
                                                                                                     
 201. Supra notes 174–78 and accompanying text. 
 202. See Perry, 265 P.3d at 1024–25 (“[T]he official proponents of an 
initiative measure have a unique relationship to the voter-approved measure 
that makes them especially likely to be reliable and vigorous advocates . . . .”). 
 203. See id. at 1006–07 (“[C]ourts have routinely permitted the official 
proponents . . . to intervene . . . to enable such proponents to assert the people’s, 
and hence the state’s, interest . . . .”). 
 204. 792 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 2010). 
 205. Id. at 688. 
 206. Id. at 700. 
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sought a writ of mandamus, and declaratory and injunctive 
relief.207 
Relying on the absence of a cases or controversies 
requirement in the Michigan Constitution and the “broader 
power held by state courts” in general, the majority held that the 
teachers had standing to sue under the state’s “limited, 
prudential [standing] doctrine that was intended to ensure 
sincere and vigorous advocacy by litigants.”208 According to this 
doctrine, “a litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause 
of action.”209 When no such action is provided by law, then a court 
should, in its discretion, determine if “the litigant has a special 
injury or right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally 
affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large or if the 
statutory scheme implies that the Legislature intended to confer 
standing on the litigant.”210 
An impassioned dissent argued that the Michigan 
Constitution’s separation of powers provision called for an injury 
in fact test, at least in the absence of statutory standing.211 It also 
cited twenty-three other states that employed an injury in fact 
approach comparable to the federal standard.212 Although the 
dissent in the Lansing case is correct to point out that a number 
of states employ an injury in fact test absent express statutory 
authority to sue, such a test has generally not been used in the 
context of initiatives in state court; all or almost all of the other 
states cited by the dissent either do not have the initiative or 
permit broader standing in situations like initiative suits than 
the federal courts would allow.213 The prudential concerns 
                                                                                                     
 207. Id. at 689.  
 208. Id. at 692–94, 699 (internal quotations omitted). 
 209. Id. at 699. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See id. at 723–31 (Corrigan, J., dissenting) (“First, the plaintiff must 
have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest.”). 
 212. Id. at 735 n.32 (citing comparable approaches in Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Mississippi, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming, Illinois, Kansas, and Virginia). 
 213. See Chi. Bar Ass’n v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 641 N.E.2d 525, 527 (Ill. 
1994) (providing broader standing than would federal courts); id. at 531–32 
(Harrison, J., dissenting) (same); In re Initiative Petition No. 384, 164 P.3d 125, 
127 (Okla. 2007) (same); Wyo. Nat’l Abortion Rights League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 
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referenced by the majority in the Michigan case are also not 
implicated in the initiative context.214 In the initiative context, a 
lawsuit has been brought by the opponents of the initiative; the 
government could defend but has chosen not to, and as a result, 
the needs of sincere and vigorous advocacy require a defense, 
which the petitioners are in a unique position to provide.215 The 
overall statutory and constitutional scheme and purpose of the 
initiative process also supports standing for proponents.216 
The remaining question is whether state separation of 
powers concerns regarding respect for other branches of 
government are implicated by conferring standing absent express 
authorization. Here we are not dealing with an act of the 
legislature, but of the people themselves. Standing is being 
conferred to defend the act of the people.217 The legislature’s 
interests are not implicated; indeed, some courts have referred to 
the people acting through the initiative as a coordinate or even 
superior legislative branch of the government.218 In this context, 
                                                                                                     
281, 285 (Wyo. 1994) (same); WATERS, supra note 56, at 12 (listing initiative 
states); see also Kanaly v. State ex rel. Janklow, 368 N.W.2d 819, 827 (S.D. 
1985) (concerning taxpayer standing); Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 
1104–06 (Utah 2013) (citing cases from seven other states applying some form of 
taxpayer/citizen standing or expanded standing for cases of great public 
importance); Maxfield v. State, 294 P.3d 895, 899–900 (Wyo. 2013) (noting 
relaxed justiciability requirements in cases of public importance).  
 214. Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 
692–95 (Mich. 2010). 
 215. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1024–25 (Cal. 2011).   
 216. Supra notes 208–10 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 218. See Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai Cnty. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 501 P.2d 391, 393 (Ariz. 1972) (“[T]he constitutional reservation of 
initiative and referendum powers establishes the electorate as a coordinate 
source of legislation with the constituted legislative bodies.”); Rooney v. 
Kulongoski, 902 P.2d 1143, 1151 (Or. 1995) (“The people, when carrying out 
their responsibilities under the initiative and referendum process, are a part of 
the Legislative Department of government.”); Utah Power & Light Co. v. Provo 
City, 74 P.2d 1191, 1205 (Utah 1937) (Larson, J., concurring) (“[B]y the 
initiative process [under the Utah Constitution] the people [are] a legislative 
body coequal in power and with superior advantages to the Legislature . . . .”); 
Wyo. Nat’l Abortion Rights League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 285 (Wyo. 1984) 
[T]he power of the electorate to enact laws through the initiative is of 
‘equal dignity’ to the power of the legislature to adopt statutes . . . . In 
Wyoming, a measure adopted through the initiative process enjoys a 
superior status because it is not subject to veto and, while it may be 
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the legislative power, as exercised by the people, is being 
enhanced, not diminished. 
A more difficult question relates to respect for the executive 
branch’s decision not to defend the law.219 Executive officials 
typically possess significant discretion in interpreting and 
applying the laws, including whether and how to defend state 
laws in court.220 A decision conferring standing on petitioners 
means, however, that the executive department’s enforcement 
decision is no longer conclusive on the defense and, therefore, no 
longer conclusive on the constitutionality of the law. By 
conferring standing on the petitioners, the courts thereby ensure 
that the executive branch’s exercise of discretion does not become 
an unreviewable determination that the initiative is invalid.221 
This, we conclude, is appropriate from a separation of powers 
perspective, because, as Professor Sunstein has explained, the 
faithful execution of the laws is “a duty, not a license.”222 The 
executive branch does not have a constitutional right to render a 
constitutional law ineffective through nonenforcement.223 And in 
                                                                                                     
amended at any time, it cannot be repealed by the legislature within 
two years of its effective date. 
(citations omitted). 
 219. See Zeitlin, supra note 162, at 328–31 (weighing the import of the 
executive’s discretion when balanced against the right of the people).   
 220. See id. at 330–31 (noting broad executive discretion to interpret, apply, 
and defend state laws); Clerk of Superior Ct. for Middlesex Cnty. v. Treasurer & 
Receiver Gen., 437 N.E.2d 158, 63 (Mass. 1982) (“[The Attorney General] may 
decline to pursue litigation which in his opinion will not further the interests of 
the Commonwealth and the public.”). 
 221. See Zeitlin, supra note 162, at 331 (urging that the role of the courts is 
to restrict the executive); Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1006–07 (Cal. 2011) 
(same). 
 222. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1471 (1988); see also Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The 
Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1628–
48 (2008) (arguing that the executive is under a duty to avoid constitutional 
harm). 
 223. See Sunstein, supra note 222, at 1471 (“[T]he ‘[T]ake Care’ clause 
[does] . . . not authorize the executive branch to violate the law through 
insufficient action any more than . . . through overzealous enforcement.”); cf. 
Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 212 (1992) (“[T]he Take Care Clause confers a 
duty insofar as it imposes on the President both a responsibility to be faithful to 
law and an obligation to enforce the law as it has been enacted, rather than as 
he would have wished it to be.”). But see Zeitlin, supra note 162, at 348–51 
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an important sense, allowing petitioners to defend the law 
respects rather than disrespects the executive branch’s 
enforcement decision, as the executive branch is not coerced into 
providing a defense that it believes to be unjustifiable and 
frivolous.224 The recent strategy of the federal government in 
handling litigation over the Defense of Marriage Act suggests 
that it is possible to accommodate the prerogative of executive 
officials to decline to defend laws they believe truly 
unconstitutional, as well as the interests of petitioners in 
defending the initiatives they proposed.225 In sum, separation of 
powers concerns rooted in the proper role of the judiciary and 
respect for other branches of government, as well as the proper 
role of the judiciary, support standing for petitioners if state 
officials will not provide a defense.  
H. Post-election Standing of Opponents and Supporters 
On the other hand, absent express statutory authority to the 
contrary, after the passage of an initiative, ordinary standing 
rules (including any injury in fact requirements) should apply to 
opponents and supporters of petitions who were not official 
proponents of the initiative. Any successful initiative of any 
significance will adversely affect at least some opponents, who 
will therefore be able to satisfy normal injury requirements.226 
There will thus not be any difficulty identifying suitable plaintiffs 
to challenge an initiative.227 Defense of the initiative will also be 
adequately provided, if not by government officials, then by 
                                                                                                     
(offering examples of deliberate subversion of the people’s will by the executive 
for nonconstitutional reasons). 
 224. Zeitlin, supra note 162, at 336–45, 351–55 (offering examples of officials 
who did not desire to defend their own laws). 
 225. See infra Part VI.B.5 (describing the Obama Administration’s approach 
to the Windsor case).  
 226. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text (discussing one-way 
ratchet problems and particular initiatives where there are obvious plaintiffs 
but no defendants other than government officials).  
 227. See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 886 (Cal. 2011) 
(deciding that the plaintiffs had standing, the court wrote that “federal courts 
have reiterated that injury in fact is not a substantial or insurmountable hurdle; 
as then Judge Alito put it: ‘Injury-in-fact is not Mount Everest.’” (citing Danvers 
Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 294 (3d Cir. 2005))). 
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proponents, who have the unique relationship and official status 
required to have standing to defend the initiative.228 Once there 
are appropriate parties representing each side, others who 
support or oppose the initiative can participate either through 
permissive intervention or as amici curiae.229 
The principles we have described should ensure vigorous 
advocacy on both sides of initiative litigation. With these 
standards in mind for state standing, we turn to the difficult 
issue of Article III standing, and the problems left unresolved by 
Hollingsworth v. Perry.  
V. Federal Court Standing Under Article III 
As we cross the constitutional divide into federal standing, 
the landscape begins to change dramatically. Although the state 
and federal courts start from the same basic premise that the 
purpose of standing is to limit courts to “questions presented in 
an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable 
of resolution through the judicial process,”230 from there, their 
paths substantially diverge. As interpreted by the Supreme Court 
since the 1970s, Article III’s case or controversy requirement 
generally limits standing in federal court to litigants who have 
suffered an injury in fact.231 Unlike in most state courts, this is 
an overriding consideration; the court does not demonstrate the 
same type of deference to the legislature’s express provision of 
standing, especially in the public law context.232 The Supreme 
Court, led by Justice Scalia on this issue, has a heightened 
                                                                                                     
 228. See supra Part IV.B–C.  
 229. See supra Part IV.F.  
 230. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). 
 231. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738–40 (1972) (discussing 
the types of injury, for example, economic harm, necessary to establish 
standing); Ass’n of Data Processing Servs. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 
(1970) (stating that standing, which is dependent on the case and controversy 
test, must look to a person “aggrieved” by agency action); Sunstein, supra note 
222, at 1445 (claiming that the Court no longer uses a legal interest test, but 
rather a factual inquiry into the existence of harm).  
 232. See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 
479–80 (2008) (describing Supreme Court’s rejection of a “private attorney 
general” approach).  
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sensitivity to congressional interference with the Executive 
Branch.233 At the same time, the Court has allowed certain types 
of private actions on the government’s behalf to proceed, such as 
qui tam and informers’ actions, apparently believing that such 
private actions either satisfy or do not require injury in fact and 
do not raise separation of powers concerns.234 The Court’s 
application of all these federal standing principles in the context 
of state initiatives is especially complicated and jarring, as the 
Court is not addressing an act of Congress but an initiative of the 
people of a particular state.235 The key question is whom the state 
can authorize to defend that initiative,236 a decision that should 
merit federal deference.237 In Hollingsworth we can see the 
                                                                                                     
 233. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (claiming 
that the concrete injury requirement acts as a safeguard for the separation of 
powers and therefore prohibits Congress from converting an undifferentiated 
public interest in executive officers’ compliance into an individual right, as it 
would transfer the President’s power to the courts); see also Antonin Scalia, The 
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 886, 894–96 (1983) (explaining how the law of standing 
requires distinctive harm and restricts courts to their assigned role of protecting 
minority rather than majority interests; absent such standing “there is no 
reason to remove the matter from the political process and place it in the 
courts”); Elliott, supra note 232, at 463, 492–96 (stating that the Court has 
suggested that standing acts as a “bulwark” against congressional 
overreaching).  
 234. See Heather Elliott, Congress’ Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 159, 195–98 (2011) (discussing the False Claims Act and its 
authorization of private citizens, called qui tam relators, to enforce its 
requirements on behalf of the United States); cf. Steven L. Winter, The 
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
1371, 1406–09 (1988) (discussing history of informers’ actions).  
 235. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 (2013) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the holding in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona 
and whether official proponents authorized by state law to assert the state’s 
interest in the validity of a challenged state initiative would have standing in a 
federal lawsuit).  
 236. See id. at 2664–65 (majority opinion) (stating that a federal court must 
determine if the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court is 
authorized by the state to represent the state’s interest); see also Arizonans for 
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997) (discussing the 
constitutionality of state law that authorizes state legislators to represent the 
state’s interests).  
 237. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2665, 2674–75 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (emphasizing the state’s role as a sovereign and the people’s 
inherent right to govern themselves).  
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tensions, upheaval, and reverberations of these clashing state 
and federal tectonics.238  
Much has been written, and most of it critical, about the 
Supreme Court’s Article III injury in fact requirement.239 
Regardless, and most relevant for the purposes of this Article, 
controlling Supreme Court precedent holds that the “plaintiff 
must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally-
protected interest which is . . . concrete and particularized.”240 
This injury in fact requirement applies both to the standing to 
sue and the standing to appeal.241 The requirement also applies 
to intervenors who seek to “step into the shoes of the original 
party.”242 
The injury in fact requirement means that a 
plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about 
government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s 
                                                                                                     
 238. See id. at 2674 (“The California Supreme Court, not this Court, 
expresses concern for vigorous representation; the California Supreme Court, 
not this Court, recognizes the necessity to avoid conflicts of interest; the 
California Supreme Court, not this Court, comprehends the real interest at 
stake in this litigation . . . .”).  
 239. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 232, at 460–517 (depicting the ways in 
which the standing doctrine is expected to serve several functions for which it is 
ill-founded); Sunstein, supra note 222, at 1434, 1448, 1461, 1474 (stating that 
standing limitations are often justified by policies that have little or nothing to 
do with standing); Sunstein, supra note 223, at 166, 177 (stating that Lujan’s 
invalidation of a congressional grant of standing is a misinterpretation of the 
Constitution); Elliott, supra note 234, at 168–77 (describing the various 
problems associated with the standing doctrine, for example, the doctrine’s 
confusing and unpredictable nature). 
 240. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Also “there 
must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained 
of . . .” and it must be likely that a favorable decision would redress the injury 
(redressability). Id. at 560–61. 
 241. See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 64 (“The standing 
Article III requires must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it 
must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance.” (citing Diamond v. 
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61 (1986))); see also Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a 
Dim Corner: Standing to Appeal and the Right to Defend a Judgment in the 
Federal Courts, 38 GA. L. REV. 813, 840 (2004) (“The standing to appeal 
requirements closely parallel those the Court has identified for standing to sue 
(injury, causation and redressability).”). 
 242. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997); see 
also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 63–64 (1986) (discussing Diamond’s 
ability as an intervening defendant to seek review). 
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interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, 
and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits 
him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article 
III case or controversy.243  
This is true even if the statute creating the plaintiff’s cause of 
action expressly provides that “any person” may commence a civil 
suit.244 The Court has also rejected taxpayer standing except in 
the rarest of situations.245 
The Court considers the injury in fact requirement, 
overriding even express legislative authorization to sue, 
necessary to avoid separation of powers problems:  
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public 
interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an 
“individual right” vindicable in the courts is to permit 
Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief 
Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to “take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed.”246  
                                                                                                     
 243. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–574; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119–
20 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The interests [represented by the plaintiffs], 
and the rights they espouse, are bereft of any personal or proprietary coloration. 
They are, as litigants, indistinguishable from any group selected at random 
from among the general population . . . .”). 
 244. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–72; see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 
737 (1972) (stating that Congress “may have been of the opinion that one likely 
to be financially injured by the issue of a license would be the only person 
having a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors 
of law in . . . granting the license” (citing FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 
309 U.S. 642, 698 (1940))); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 
(2009) (“[T]he requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III 
jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.”); Elliott, supra note 232, at 479 
(“The Court has rejected a general federal concept of a pure ‘private attorney 
general,’ who pursues lawbreakers through the courts solely from an interest in 
seeking the law obeyed.”).  
 245. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599–607 
(2007) (discussing and limiting the taxpayer standing found in Flast v. Cohen); 
see also Elliott, supra note 232, at 480, 480 n.101, and cases cited therein 
(claiming that the Court has rejected “taxpayer” standing because permitting 
one taxpayer to challenge the uses to which her tax payments have been put 
would open the courts to endless challenges by all taxpayers).  
 246. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1991) (quoting U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 3). 
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This approach, again, has been heavily criticized.247 Application 
of these separation of powers principles to standing on appeal is 
even more problematic: “Doctrines limiting standing to appeal 
from lower court decisions do not keep cases out of the judicial 
bailiwick . . . . Thus, when it comes to appeals from lower courts 
to intermediate appellate courts or to the Supreme Court, 
separation of powers concerns are not part of the equation.”248 
There are also well-recognized exceptions to the injury in fact 
requirement, most notably qui tam and informer actions.249 In a 
qui tam action, a private citizen is given the right to bring suits 
against violators of criminal law and is allowed to retain a share 
of the resulting damages or fines.250 In Vermont Agency of 
Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,251 the Court 
upheld the qui tam provisions in the False Claims Act that 
allowed private citizens to sue on behalf of the United States for 
fraud against the government, even though they had suffered no 
direct harm themselves.252 The Stevens Court ultimately relied on 
the theory that the relator, who had no direct interest in the 
alleged false claims other than the statutory right to litigate, was 
a partial assignee of the government’s claim for damages.253 
Likewise, in an informer action, a person can bring suit for the 
                                                                                                     
 247. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he principal 
effect of foreclosing judicial enforcement of [administrative] procedures is to 
transfer power into the hands of the Executive at the expense—not of the 
courts—but of Congress . . . .”); see also Sunstein, supra note 222, at 1471–72 
(“The ‘take Care’ clause and concerns of separation of powers argue in favor of 
rather than against a judicial role when statutory beneficiaries challenge agency 
behavior as legally inadequate.”); Elliott, supra note 232, at 464, 493–96 
(discussing the sharp disagreement over what separation of powers requires).  
 248. Steinman, supra note 241, at 845. 
 249. See Sunstein, supra note 223, at 175 (“Under the qui tam action, a 
citizen—who might well be a stranger—is permitted to bring suits against 
offenders of the law.”).  
 250. See id. (“The purpose of this action is to give citizens a right to bring 
civil suits to help in the enforcement of the federal criminal law.”); see also 
Elliott, supra note 234, at 195–98 (explaining how the False Claims Act 
authorizes private citizens, qui tam relators, to enforce its requirements on 
behalf of the United States).  
 251. 529 U.S. 765 (2000). 
 252. Id. at 771–78; Elliott, supra note 232, at 495. 
 253. See Stevens, 529 U.S. at 770, 773 (“[A]dequate basis for the relator’s 
suit for his bounty is to be found in the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has 
standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor.”).  
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enforcement of public duties and receive a financial reward.254 
According to the Supreme Court: “Statutes providing for actions 
by a common informer, who himself has no interest whatever in 
the controversy other than that given by statute, have been in 
existence for hundreds of years in England, and in this country 
since the foundation of our government.”255 
How the qui tam and informer exceptions square with the 
general injury in fact rule is not all that clear.256 Private 
individuals are being allowed to sue on behalf of the government 
when they are not otherwise differently positioned than anyone 
else.257 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife258—the key case setting 
out the present test for standing—Justice Scalia, who would later 
author the Court’s opinion in Stevens, dismissed the issue with a 
one liner: “Nor, finally, is it the unusual case in which Congress 
has created a concrete private interest in the outcome of a suit 
against a private party for the government’s benefit, by providing 
a cash bounty for the victorious plaintiff.”259 If Congress can 
satisfy the injury in fact requirement by simply allowing any sort 
of bounty or financial reward to any victorious plaintiff, the 
requirement appears relatively easily satisfied.260 Yet separation 
of powers concerns would still remain. As the commentators have 
pointed out, informer actions allow private parties to enlist the 
courts to supervise government officials, and providing a bounty 
would likely encourage more lawsuits.261 And as to qui tam 
                                                                                                     
 254. See id. at 774–78 (noting the history of statutes that allowed informers 
to obtain a portion of the penalty as a bounty for their information, even if they 
had not suffered an injury themselves). 
 255. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943) 
(citing Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905)).  
 256. See Elliott, supra note 234, at 197–98 (speculating as to the ways in 
which the Court would confront an informer’s suit under the application of 
contemporary standing).  
 257. See id. at 198 (describing informers’ actions, which essentially create 
“private prosecutors” and allow plaintiffs to share in the bounty of resulting 
damages).  
 258. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 259. Id. at 572–73.  
 260. See Sunstein, supra note 223, at 232–34 (noting that qui tam action and 
the informers’ action both support the notion that standing applies when the 
plaintiff has a concrete interest in the form of a bounty).  
 261. See Elliott, supra note 234, at 204 (stating that the bounty makes 
lawsuits more attractive (citing J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the 
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actions, the choice of “whom to prosecute for defrauding the 
government seems as much or more at the heart of the executive 
function” as deciding who may be sued for damaging the 
environment in Lujan.262 Moreover, government officials 
dissatisfied with the outcome of the political or administrative 
process might be tempted to bring intragovernmental disputes to 
the courts.263 
Applying these federal standing principles to state initiatives 
is even more complicated. The court must not only consider 
general federal standing principles but other important 
federalism concerns as well. The federal separation of legislative, 
executive and judicial powers is not incorporated through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and is therefore 
not strictly applied to how the states structure their 
government.264 Federalism also requires deference to such 
structuring decisions by the states.265 That deference includes 
respect for states that have authorized the initiative,266 and 
respect for state decision-making regarding who is authorized to 
defend the initiative in court.267 
                                                                                                     
English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 549 (2000))).  
 262. Elliott, supra note 232, at 495 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 209 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)).  
 263. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 831–34 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) 
(instructing the Court to exercise restraint in disputes that only involve officials, 
“and the official interests of those, who serve in the branches of the National 
Government” given the distance these cases pose from the traditional common 
law suits at the core of the case-or-controversy requirement).  
 264. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (plurality 
opinion) (“[T]he concept of separation of powers embodied in the United States 
Constitution is not mandatory in state governments.”); Prentis v. Atl. Coast 
Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 225 (1908) (“[W]hen, as here, a state constitution sees fit 
to unite legislative and judicial powers in a single hand, there is nothing to 
hinder, so far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned.”). 
 265. See Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937) 
(“How power shall be distributed by a state among its governmental organs is 
commonly, if not always, a question for the state itself.”); see also ROBERT F. 
WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 240 (2009) (“The federal 
Constitution does not mandate a specific separation or distribution of powers for 
the states.”). 
 266. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013) (explaining 
California’s sovereign right to maintain an initiative process).  
 267. See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987) (accepting New Jersey law 
as permitting the state legislature to defend state laws). 
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With all these key principles in mind, we return briefly to 
Hollingsworth for an evaluation of their application. The 
standing of the plaintiff same-sex couples was not an issue.268 The 
majority and dissent also agreed that the state had standing to 
defend an initiative against constitutional challenge, as the 
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the invalidation 
of a state statute is an injury to the state that satisfies the 
standing requirements.269 Thus, if the state chose to defend the 
case, there would be no question of its justiciability in federal 
court.270 The difficulties arose once the state chose not to defend 
the initiative.271  
In deciding that only state officials or official state agents 
could defend the initiative, the majority in Hollingsworth focused 
on its ordinary injury in fact and separation of powers concerns, 
treating the state initiative the same as if it were a statute 
passed by Congress.272 It made no allowances for the purposes 
and peculiarities of initiatives or the different conception of 
separation of powers applicable to the states.273 It appeared to 
disregard federalism principles more generally, imposing its own 
agency test on the states for the determination of who could 
defend initiative statutes or amendments in federal court.274 It 
also limited the defense of the initiative to government officials 
who may not want to defend it, thereby defeating the objective of 
vigorous advocacy at the heart of all standing jurisprudence.275 
                                                                                                     
 268. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
 269. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.  
 270. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664 (“To vindicate that interest or any 
other, a State must be able to designate agents to represent it in federal court.”).  
 271. See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
 273. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662–63, 2667–68 (explaining that no 
matter how committed the petitioners may be to upholding Proposition 8, 
Article III standing cannot be placed in the hands of concerned bystanders). 
 274. See id. at 2666–67 (stating that California’s state-conferred right falls 
short of meeting federal requirements because it fails to follow the Restatement 
(Third) of Agency (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f (2005))); 
see also id. at 2670–71 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing valid reasons why 
California might find a conventional agency relationship inconsistent with the 
initiative process).  
 275. See id. at 2674 (noting the irony in the Court’s insistence upon 
litigation conducted by state officials, despite those officials’ preference to lose). 
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Finally, it failed to confront exceptions such as qui tam and 
informer actions.276  
In contrast, the dissent incorporated these considerations 
into its decision. It recognized that the initiative is designed to 
allow the people to direct change in the face of recalcitrant 
government officials and notes that it contradicts the very 
purpose of the initiative—to give government officials the power 
to defeat the initiative by refusing to defend it.277 Applying 
federalism principles more generally, it concluded that the 
primary issue is not justiciability in federal court or injury in fact, 
but who has the authority to defend a state initiative, and that is 
a question for which federal courts owe great deference to the 
states.278 As the dissent stated:  
It is for California, not this Court, to determine whether and to 
what extent the Election Code provisions are instructive and 
relevant in determining the authority of proponents to assert 
the State’s interest in postenactment judicial proceedings. And 
it is likewise not for this Court to say that a State must 
determine the substance and meaning of its laws by statute, or 
by judicial decision, or by a combination of the two.279 
It further recognized that the majority’s approach is in tension 
with other cases in which the Court has permitted individuals to 
assert claims on behalf of the government or others, including qui 
tam actions.280  
Both the majority and the dissent focused on the judiciary’s 
proper role in a democracy.281 The majority’s concern was to 
“prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers 
                                                                                                     
 276. See id. at 2665 (majority opinion) (attempting to distinguish qui tam 
standing in a parenthetical). 
 277. Id. at 2668–70, 2674–75. 
 278. Id. at 2668–70, 2675. 
 279. Id. at 2669. 
 280. See id. at 2673–74 (listing a range of cases in which the Court, despite a 
lack of an agency relationship, nonetheless permitted a party to assert the 
interests of another).  
 281. See id. at 2659, 2661, 2667 (majority opinion) (discussing the judicial 
power of federal courts to decide actual cases or controversies); id. at 2674–75 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (claiming that the Court’s opinion means that a single 
district court can make a decision with far-reaching effects without review); see 
also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (discussing the “proper—and 
properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society”). 
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of the political branches,”282 which again seems to ignore that the 
initiative is different.283 Initiatives are passed by the people 
themselves, not the legislature, and the executive branch has no 
veto rights over initiatives in state constitutions.284 The dissent, 
in contrast, stressed that in a democracy “the right to make law 
rests in the people and flows to the government, not the other 
way around,” and that the majority’s standing decision reverses 
the process, greatly empowering government officials to overturn 
initiatives of the people by depriving them of a defense.285 
The dissent seems to have the better of the argument 
regarding the judiciary’s proper role. Although the Supreme 
Court has not been bothered by the possibility that nobody would 
ever have standing to raise or defend a particular claim against 
the government, this is because, in the absence of such a suit, the 
political process as usual will control: “Our system of government 
leaves many crucial decisions to the political processes. The 
assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one 
would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.”286 But 
here the political process through the initiative has been 
thwarted by the inaction of government officials and the standing 
doctrine of the federal courts.287 This seems to be a problem of a 
different kind. The appellant is seeking enforcement of “the 
political resolution as it is expressed in law.”288 Here arguments 
“that invoke the primacy of the democratic process call for 
judicial involvement.”289 Also, under the majority’s approach, the 
                                                                                                     
 282. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (quoting Clapper v. 
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013)). 
 283. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text. 
 284. Id.; see also Zeitlin, supra note 162 (suggesting that the executive 
branch may not exercise such excessive discretion as to leave its invalidation of 
the initiative unreviewable). 
 285. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 286. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 
(1974); see Elliott, supra 232, at 481 (“The Court has also rejected concerns, 
raised by lower courts, that if standing is denied ‘then as a practical matter no 
one can [sue].’”). 
 287. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating 
that the Court’s decision frustrates the ability of the people to exercise their 
sovereign right to govern themselves). 
 288. Sunstein, supra note 222, at 1472. 
 289. Id.  
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judiciary is involved only to protect the interests of one side: 
those, including state officials, who would prefer the initiative be 
wiped off the books.290 
Although it is our belief that the dissent and not the majority 
decision is correct, reconsidering Hollingsworth is not the overall 
purpose of the Article. Rather, our intention is to work out the 
case’s problems and, more importantly, to propose solutions to 
those problems within its defined parameters. We believe that is 
possible pursuant to the agency approach left open by the 
majority, and also that there may still be openings in the 
traditional standing doctrine. We therefore return to the agency 
requirements described by the majority in Hollingsworth, and 
how they can be transformed into workable standing 
requirements that respect and incorporate both state and federal 
standing practices and principles. 
VI. The Interplay of Federal and State Standing in the Aftermath 
of Hollingsworth 
A. Agency and Standing Requirements Post-Hollingsworth 
In rejecting the California Supreme Court’s view that the 
Proposition 8 petitioners were authorized to defend the state 
initiative, the majority in Hollingsworth drew distinctions 
between authority and agency and then narrowly defined the 
type of state agents that would be allowed to defend state 
initiatives.291 The Court held fast to its fundamental distinction 
that public officials have standing to defend the legality of laws 
while private parties ordinarily only have standing to defend 
against particularized harm to themselves arising out of the 
application of those laws.292 This section addresses those 
                                                                                                     
 290. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2674–75 (2013) (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting) (noting that the Court, despite the importance of vigorous 
advocacy in the judicial system, has permitted state officials with no intention of 
defending initiative to control litigation).  
 291. See id. at 2666–67 (majority opinion) (stating that because the 
“petitioners answer to no one,” and “decide for themselves, with no review, what 
arguments to make,” the most basic features of an agency relationship are 
missing).  
 292. See id. at 2667–68 (claiming that states cannot bypass the established 
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requirements and proposes five alternatives in response, 
recognizing that some of the proposals remain somewhat risky 
propositions unless the Court does some rethinking.  
The agency or authority issue was based on the following 
principle:  
To vindicate [its interests, including its interests in defending 
the constitutionality of its laws], a State must be able to 
designate agents to represent it in federal court. That agent is 
typically the State’s attorney general. But state law may 
provide for other officials to speak for the State in federal 
court . . . .293  
In Karcher v. May,294 the key precedent for this argument, New 
Jersey law apparently295 authorized the presiding officers of each 
house of the state legislature to represent the state’s interests on 
behalf of the legislature.296 The Karcher Court respected this 
designation and would have granted standing to these officers, 
but nonetheless the Court dismissed the case because Karcher 
and Orechio, his counterpart in the state senate, were no longer 
presiding officers, and their successors did not wish to appeal.297 
                                                                                                     
standard against generalized grievances by “issuing to private parties who 
otherwise lack standing a ticket to the federal courthouse”). 
 293. Id. at 2664; see also Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 288 (1885) 
(“The State is a political corporate body [that] can act only through 
agents . . . .”). 
 294. 484 U.S. 72 (1987). 
 295. The Karcher Court did not identify any state statute providing this 
authorization. Id. at 82. The only authority cited to substantiate the legislators’ 
standing was a single case in which the New Jersey Supreme Court permitted 
Karcher and Orechio to intervene and join the state attorney general in 
defending a reapportionment statute. See In re Forsythe, 450 A.2d 499, 500 
(N.J. 1982) (confirming the Court’s approval of the Speaker of the General 
Assembly and the President of the Senate’s standing to intervene as parties in 
defending the validity of the enactment). Of course, being permitted to intervene 
is not the same thing as being granted independent authority to litigate. See 
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (“Although intervenors are 
considered parties entitled . . . . to seek review by this Court, an intervenor’s 
right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention 
was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills 
the requirements of Art. III.”).   
 296. See Karcher, 484 U.S. at 82 (“Since the New Jersey Legislature had 
authority under state law to represent the State’s interests in both the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals, we need not vacate the judgments below for 
lack of a proper defendant-appellant.”).  
 297. See id. at 77–81 (explaining that when a public officer is a party to an 
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The Hollingsworth Court interpreted Karcher as standing 
only for the proposition that state officials besides the attorney 
general could be designated as the state’s agent for defending a 
statute in court.298 “The point of Karcher is not that a State could 
authorize private parties to represent its interests; Karcher and 
Orechio were permitted to proceed only because they were state 
officers, acting in an official capacity.”299 Once they no longer held 
office, they lost their standing as state agents.300 
The Court also addressed dicta in its decision in Arizonans 
for Official English v. Arizona.301 In that case, after a federal 
district judge declared a ballot initiative unconstitutional and the 
governor announced she would not appeal, the principal sponsor 
of the initiative sought to do so; the Ninth Circuit then held the 
sponsor had standing.302 An article in the initiative granted 
standing to “any person residing in Arizona to sue in state court 
to enforce the [initiative].”303 The Supreme Court in Arizonans for 
Official English dismissed the case as moot on other grounds but 
addressed the standing issue in passing.304 After describing the 
holding in Karcher, the Court wrote that the sponsors are 
not elected representatives, and we are aware of no Arizona 
law appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of 
Arizona to defend, in lieu of public officials, the 
constitutionality of the initiatives made law of the State. Nor 
has this Court ever identified initiative proponents as Article-
III-qualified defenders of the measures they advocated.305  
                                                                                                     
appeal in an official capacity and subsequently ceases to hold office, the public 
officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party (citing FED. R. APP. P. 
43(c)(1))).  
 298. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664–65 (2013) (stating 
that Karcher and Orechio were able to intervene in the lawsuit solely because of 
their positions as state officers). 
 299. Id. at 2665. 
 300. Id. 
 301. 520 U.S. 43 (1997). 
 302. Id. at 49, 55, 57–58 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s rationale that 
because the Arizona Legislature would have standing to defend the 
constitutionality of a state statute, Arizonans for Official English, by analogy, 
should have standing as a principal sponsor of the ballot).  
 303. Id. at 58. 
 304. Id. at 64–67.  
 305. Id. at 65 (emphasis omitted). 
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Applying these precedents in Hollingsworth, the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated that the California Supreme Court did not 
find that the petitioners were agents of the people, nor had the 
petitioners argued below that they were agents of the people.306 
The Court explained that the petitioners are “plainly not agents 
of the state . . . [because] the most basic features of an agency 
relationship are missing here. Agency requires more than mere 
authorization to assert a particular interest.”307 The Court then 
turned to the most recent Restatement of Agency to define those 
features: the principal’s right to control the agent’s action, the 
principal’s ability to remove or replace the agent, and a fiduciary 
duty to the principal.308 The Court then compared the petitioners 
to the California Attorney General and other public officials, who 
are elected at regular intervals and take an oath of office.309 
Finding these elements lacking, the majority refused to allow the 
proponents to act as agents for the state.310 
B. Four Alternatives to Satisfy Hollingsworth, and One to Make It 
Irrelevant 
There are certain advantages to the majority approach. It 
requires the people, and therefore the state, to articulate by law 
or specify in each initiative exactly how the initiative should be 
defended after its passage.311 There is no need to rely upon 
elaborate after-the-fact justification by state courts to decipher 
who has authority to defend a state law.312 
                                                                                                     
 306. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2013) (stating that 
the California Supreme Court only addressed whether petitioners had the 
ability to assert the State’s interest in defense of Proposition 8). 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f (2005)).  
 309. See id. at 2666–67 (noting that unlike California’s attorney general, the 
petitioners have an unelected appointment for an unspecified period of time as 
defenders of the initiative and are not required to take an oath of office).  
 310. See id. at 2667 (“Neither the California Supreme Court nor the Ninth 
Circuit ever described the proponents as agents of the State, and they plainly do 
not qualify as such.”).  
 311. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664 (confirming that a state may 
designate agents to represent it in federal court through specific state law).  
 312. Compare Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662–63 (2013) 
(concluding that the California Constitution gives proponents a unique role only 
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If the distrust of public officials underlying the origins of the 
initiative extends to the post-passage defense of the initiative in 
court, there is good reason for the initiative to express and 
address that concern, especially after Hollingsworth. Although 
the majority’s approach imposes strict requirements on litigants 
other than those government officials ordinarily expected to 
defend state laws, it does provide a road map, albeit one filled 
with some giant pitfalls, for access to the federal courthouse.313 
As the Court intimated that a litigant could conceivably possess 
standing on behalf of the state or pursuant to a Lujan analysis,314 
we attempt to lay out paths under both theories. We also suggest 
a possible way to bypass the standing problem entirely. 
1. Special State Attorney 
The only certain path through Hollingsworth, as Dean 
Chemerinsky and others have suggested, is for the initiative or 
the laws generally governing initiatives to require “that a special 
attorney for the state be appointed in each instance that the 
government elects not to defend an initiative.”315 This special 
attorney would not be representing petitioners’ interests, but 
rather the interest of the state, and therefore the people, in the 
legality of its laws.316 This special state attorney would have 
standing under Hollingsworth because he or she would fulfill the 
                                                                                                     
in the process of enacting the law, not in the enforcement of the law), with Perry 
v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1142–52 (Cal. 2011) (determining that Article II, 
Section 8 of the California Constitution, as well as certain provisions of the 
Elections Code, implicitly authorize the official proponents of an initiative 
measure to intervene in a judicial proceeding in order to assert the state’s 
interest in the initiative’s validity).  
 313. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659–68 (providing an analysis of the 
ways in which private parties may or may not participate in a federal action in 
order to defend the constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have 
chosen not to). 
 314. See id. at 2661 (stating that standing can rest on whether there was a 
concrete and particularized injury).  
 315. Chemerinsky, supra note 72. 
 316. See id. (“Because the attorney, even if not a state employee, would be 
appointed by the state, he or she would be representing the state and therefore 
have standing.”).  
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Restatement requirements to be an agent of the state.317 “Such a 
process would be well within the bounds of established law, since 
states get to decide for themselves who will represent them in 
court.”318 The people themselves can make this choice through the 
initiative process, or they can persuade their legislators to do 
so;319 it need not be left to the discretion of state executive 
officials. 
In order to satisfy Hollingsworth’s strict requirements for 
Article III standing, the process and standards for the selection or 
removal and replacement—or both—of the special state attorney 
should be set out directly in each initiative or in the laws 
governing initiatives.320 An oath should also be required of the 
special state attorney as it is for other state officials.321 The 
special state attorney need not, however, be a public employee. 
Special attorneys general are periodically appointed when the 
offices of the attorneys general are conflicted or unwilling to 
defend a state actor or state action.322 Even though they are 
usually private lawyers, not public officials, they are representing 
the state.323 
                                                                                                     
 317. See id. (stating that this appointment is well within the state’s 
prerogative and is in keeping with the decision in Hollingsworth); see also 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666–67 (2013) (describing the agency 
status of public officials and its solidification of their standing).  
 318. Chemerinsky, supra note 72. 
 319. Cf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-921(A) (2012) (granting standing and the right 
of intervention to official initiative proponents). 
 320. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666–67 (noting that state law did not 
provide for selection or removal of petitioners). 
 321. See id. at 2667 (stating that petitioners “are free to pursue a purely 
ideological commitment to the law’s constitutionality without the need to take 
cognizance of resource constraints, changes in public opinion, or potential 
ramifications for other state priorities”); cf. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[A]ll 
executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several 
States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.”). 
 322. See Chemerinsky, supra note 72 (noting that states appoint special 
attorneys in instances “when there is a conflict of interest”). 
 323. Id. 
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2. Proponents as Agents of the People 
An alternative approach, but one facing greater obstacles 
under Hollingsworth, is to designate petitioners explicitly as the 
state’s (or the people’s) agents. Some advocacy groups, such as 
the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, were mulling such a 
solution immediately after the issuance of the Supreme Court’s 
decision.324 The Hollingsworth majority, however, is clearly 
uncomfortable with this agency approach because it collapses the 
Court’s clear distinction between public and private injury, where 
the state can defend the legality of its laws, while private parties 
are only allowed to defend against particularized harm they 
suffer when the laws are enforced.325 The Restatement approach 
to agency, designed for individual relationships among private 
parties, also translates awkwardly to the much more amorphous 
relationship between initiative proponents and the people as a 
whole.326  
That said, a legislative or initiative provision could be 
drafted to respond to the Court’s strict requirements. Such a 
provision must, of course, expressly designate proponents as 
agents of the people for the purpose of defending the initiative 
statute, should government officials decline to do so.327 But the 
law must also address the more particular requirements imposed 
by the Hollingsworth majority. To ensure the petitioners’ faithful 
defense of the law, the initiative should require that they take an 
oath to defend the constitutionality of the law, and post a defense 
bond.328 The bond would be designed to ensure that the 
                                                                                                     
 324. See Audi, supra note 62, at A3 (stating that the Howard Jarvis 
Taxpayers Association “is looking into building a ‘left–right coalition’ to see if 
there is a way to fix the problem—possibly through another ballot initiative that 
would define ballot proponents as agents of the state”). 
 325. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667–68 (2013). 
 326. See id. at 2671–72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing reasons why 
California “might conclude that a conventional agency relationship is 
inconsistent with the history, design, and purpose of the initiative process,” and 
noting confusion on who the principal in the agency relationship would be). 
 327. Compare id. at 2666 (majority opinion) (noting that the California 
Supreme Court “never described petitioners as ‘agents of the people’” of 
California), with supra Part VI.A (stating that the agency authority issue was 
based on a state vindicating its interests by being able “to designate agents to 
represent it in federal court”). 
 328. Compare Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (“Unlike California’s elected 
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petitioners carry out their fiduciary duty to defend the initiative 
competently and with the utmost care.329 It could also limit 
frivolous appeals and dilatory litigation tactics.330 The amount 
could be set by the legislature with these objectives in mind. 
Oversight of the proponents’ defense must also be established.331 
A post-election defense oversight committee, consisting of 
supporters of the initiative from throughout the state other than 
the individual petitioners, might be required.332 In principle, 
under Hollingsworth a carefully constructed agency approach 
may be devised so that the petitioners could represent the state’s 
interests in federal court. Of course, because Hollingsworth does 
not purport to lay out all elements necessary to establish 
standing in a situation like this, there is always the risk that the 
Court could impose some new, as-yet-unelucidated requirement 
that would not be met.333 
                                                                                                     
officials, they have taken no oath of office.”), with supra Part VI.B.1 (“An oath 
should be required of the special state attorney as it is for other state officials.”). 
 329. Cf. Clerk of Superior Court of Middlesex Cnty. v. Treasurer & Receiver 
Gen., 437 N.E.2d 158, 159 (Mass. 1982) (discussing statutory bond requirement 
imposed on court clerks “to ensure the faithful performance of official duties”); 
City of Cambridge v. Foster, 81 N.E. 278, 279 (Mass. 1907) (discussing statutory 
bond requirements imposed on constables). 
 330. Cf. Hampshire Vill. Assocs. v. Dist. Court of Hampshire, 408 N.E.2d 
830, 833 (Mass. 1980) (discussing use of statutory appeal bonds in landlord–
tenant disputes to deter frivolous appeals); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 369 N.E.2d 
985, 987, 989–90 (Mass. 1977) (upholding legislature’s imposition of $2,000 
bond, with certain exceptions, to deter frivolous medical malpractice claims). 
 331. Compare Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2013) 
(“[P]etitioners answer to no one.”), with supra Part VI.A (explaining that an 
agency relationship fails because there would be no control over the agent). 
 332. Compare Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (“No provision provides for 
their removal.”), with supra Part VI.A (looking to the Restatement of Agency to 
highlight the importance of the principal having removal power over the agent). 
There are precedents for such representative or oversight committees. See 
ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.030 (2012) (requiring appointment of initiative committee 
of three sponsors who represent the sponsors and subscribers in all matters 
regarding the initiative); cf. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 250.137–250.149 (2012) 
(establishing citizens review committees to, among other things, draft unbiased 
arguments in favor of and against initiative measures). 
 333. Cf. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666–67. 
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3. Defender’s Bounty: Pushing the Qui Tam and Informer’s 
Actions to the Limits 
In light of the unclear requirements for petitioners to be 
considered proper state agents, we also propose two paths for 
them to satisfy the traditional Article III standing test in their 
own right. A somewhat questionable option would be to include in 
the initiative or the laws governing initiatives a monetary bounty 
for the successful defense of an initiative when the government 
has declined to defend it.334 This qui tam-like approach has at 
least some precedent for it. Arguably, as in a qui tam or 
informer’s action, the private party is seeking a reward for acting 
in the state’s interest (here, successfully defending the 
constitutionality of the statute when the government erroneously 
declined to provide such a defense).335 The litigant also has a 
financial stake in the outcome beyond attorney’s fees.336 The 
bounty, at least in theory, provides a particularized interest, 
albeit to anyone willing to invest in a defense of the initiative.337 
As this is a state law, there is also no concern about the 
congressional overreaching that heightens the Supreme Court’s 
separation of powers concerns.338 The court is confronting state, 
not federal, action, as well as action by the people as a whole, not 
a particular branch of government.339 It is therefore difficult to 
                                                                                                     
 334. See Elliott, supra note 234, at 200–04 (discussing the constitutionality 
and practicality of cash bounties); Sunstein, supra note 223, at 232–34 
(discussing cash bounties for private citizens in suits brought against private 
and executive defendants). 
 335. See supra notes 249–63 and accompanying text. 
 336. Compare Sunstein, supra note 223, at 233 (“[T]he existence of a cash 
bounty gives the plaintiff the equivalent of a personal stake in the outcome.”), 
with Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (“Obviously, 
however, a plaintiff cannot achieve standing to litigate a substantive issue by 
bringing suit for the cost of bringing suit. The litigation must give the plaintiff 
some other benefit besides reimbursement of costs that are a byproduct of the 
litigation itself.”). 
 337. See Sunstein, supra note 223, at 223–24 (“[A] bounty would build 
directly on the qui tam and informers’ actions, and it should not raise a 
constitutional problem in the aftermath of Lujan.”). 
 338. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577; see also Elliott, supra note 232, at 463 
(discussing Supreme Court’s concerns regarding congressional overreaching). 
 339. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) 
(“[R]espect for the separation of powers requires the Judicial Branch to exercise 
restraint in deciding constitutional issues by resolving those implicating the 
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discern what separation of powers issues regarding the different 
branches of government are implicated. Because there would 
clearly be a justiciable case or controversy if the state decided to 
defend it, it is not the type of political dispute inappropriate for 
resolution in the courts.340 All this being said, the Hollingsworth 
majority has gone out of its way to distinguish and dismiss qui 
tam actions as historical anomalies to injury in fact 
requirements.341 Although the Court in Stevens wrote approvingly 
about the historical pedigree of the informer’s action, such a 
bounty has not been tested against the modern standing doctrine; 
it is unclear that the “assignee” rationale of Stevens would apply 
to this situation.342 The general thrust of Hollingsworth is to 
reject private suits to defend the constitutionality of statutes 
absent particularized harm, and a bounty is not a remedy for 
harm caused by the statute itself, which the Court appears to 
require.343 
4. Refundable Filing Fees: Letting Proponents Buy a Stake in the 
Initiative 
In our next proposal, the state would charge a filing or 
similar fee before an initiative is adopted, which would be 
refunded to the petitioners if they successfully defended the 
initiative in court. Some states already charge a filing fee or 
deposit that may be refunded if the petition qualifies for the 
ballot, no doubt to discourage frivolous petitions.344 In the same 
vein, legislators or initiative drafters would introduce a fee, 
                                                                                                     
powers of the three branches of Government as a ‘last resort.’”). 
 340. Cf. Elliott, supra note 232, at 512 (discussing an example of the 
Supreme Court properly exercising its Article III powers to address the merits of 
a case where the “excellence of argument and adversarial presentation of issues” 
is assured). 
 341. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 (2013) (distinguishing 
cases involving qui tam actions). 
 342. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943) 
(discussing the long history of informer’s actions). But see Vt. Agency of Natural 
Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 777 n.7 (2000) 
(characterizing this footnote as dictum). 
 343. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667. 
 344. See WATERS, supra note 56, at 15 (listing the five states that require a 
deposit, refundable when the completed petition has been filed). 
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perhaps $1,000, to be paid to the state at some point before the 
initiative could be placed on the ballot. If the initiative passed 
and required a successful legal defense in which the proponents 
participated, at least a portion of the fee would be paid back to 
the petitioners.345 They would assert their right to defend the 
initiative—and recover the fee—by filing a claim with the state 
identifying the litigation in which the initiative had been 
challenged, which the state would pay only upon the favorable 
conclusion of the suit. This refund provision might be limited to 
situations in which government officials declined to defend the 
initiative, or it could be drafted to apply where the proponents 
were acting as intervenors or amici as well. 
The legal significance of the refundable filing fee is as 
follows. The petitioners would retain a property right in 
reimbursement of the filing fee that is contingent on their 
successful defense of the initiative in court. On the same day as 
Hollingsworth, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a claim for 
money is the quintessential injury for standing purposes: in 
United States v. Windsor,346 it held that the plaintiff’s “ongoing 
claim for funds that the [government] refuses to pay . . . 
establishes a controversy sufficient for Article III jurisdiction.”347 
Therefore, this arrangement sets up an interest cognizable under 
Article III that would be determined by the success or failure of 
the initiative in the courts.348 To put the proposal in Lujan terms, 
                                                                                                     
 345. We envision that only some of the money would be refunded for a 
successful defense for two reasons. First, it is not just possible but likely that a 
controversial initiative would be subject to multiple challenges, possibly at 
different times and in different courts. See Kafker & Russcol, supra note 64, at 
1293 (discussing various potential challenges to initiatives). If the petitioners 
received a full refund after successfully defending a state court suit, any claim 
to federal court standing might be eliminated. See United States v. Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013) (“It would be a different case if the Executive had taken 
the further step of paying Windsor the refund to which she was entitled under 
the District Court’s ruling.”). Second, courts often invalidate part but not all of 
an initiative. See MILLER, supra note 75, at 105 (stating that courts struck down 
in whole or in part 44% of initiatives that faced post-election challenges in the 
leading five states). To provide clarity and avoid possible discretionary 
complications, we propose that a fixed portion of the fee would be refunded 
whenever, at the conclusion of a lawsuit, any part of the initiative was upheld. 
 346. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 347. Id. at 2686. 
 348. See id. at 2685 (indicating that failure to obtain a refund allegedly 
required by law is a concrete injury). 
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the proponents suffer an injury in fact caused by the state if they 
are unable to recover the filing fee due to the state’s 
unwillingness or inability to defend the legality of their 
initiative.349 And this injury is redressable because victory on the 
merits results in a monetary payment to the petitioners and 
continued viability of the contingent right to the rest of the fee.350 
Because the claim for a refund is a state-conferred property 
right, it is not merely a byproduct of litigation.351 Even though 
the petitioners’ interest in a few hundred dollars is tangential 
to—and probably insignificant compared with—the ideological 
reasons for pursuing and defending an initiative, the standing 
inquiry is completely separate from the merits of the underlying 
claims.352 This proposal should, therefore, give the proponents a 
sufficient stake to confer Article III standing. 
Although a large filing fee would be open to criticism as 
antidemocratic given the purposes of the initiative, it would 
certainly be reasonable for a state to seek to defray some of the 
significant costs of processing and holding elections on initiative 
petitions.353 And, as a practical matter, any individuals or 
organizations capable of shepherding a petition through the 
signature-gathering and campaigning processes would be able to 
                                                                                                     
 349. See id. at 2685 (noting that the Executive decided not to defend § 3 of 
the Defense of Marriage Act “while continuing to deny refunds”). 
 350. Cf. id. at 2686 (“The judgment in question orders the United States to 
pay Windsor the refund she seeks.”). 
 351. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 
U.S. 765, 772–74 (2000) (concluding that the alleged injury in fact was not 
merely a byproduct of litigation, allowing the respondent to assert a cognizable 
claim). 
 352. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973) (“We have allowed 
important interests to be vindicated by plaintiffs with [little] at stake . . . . ’[A]n 
identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of principle . . . .’” 
(quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 601, 613 (1968))). The federal courts continue to apply this principle. See, 
e.g., Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 76 (1st Cir. 2012) (applying the 
standard set out in SCRAP); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1351 
(11th Cir. 2009) (“The slightness of their burden also is not dispositive.”).  
 353. See Kafker & Russcol, supra note 64, at 1320 n.342 (discussing 
examples of estimated costs “of $15 million to conduct election for invalid 
initiative” and $1.75 million “to determine sufficiency of petition and 
signature”). 
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afford a fee in the hundreds, or even thousands, of dollars.354 
Unlike the bounty proposal, the money at stake would have an 
independent origin and significance apart from the litigation.355 
This idea is also distinct from the qui tam and informer’s suits, 
which the Court seems to construe narrowly.356 The state, by 
taking the filing fee but not defending the initiative, is inflicting 
not only a political injury—which the Hollingsworth Court found 
insufficient357—but now also a monetary one. This should 
establish the proponents’ standing under the principles expressed 
in Hollingsworth and Windsor.358 
5. Breaking the One-Way Ratchet: Staging an Intervention 
Through Windsor 
Questions regarding petitioners’ standing become moot, 
however, if another party with standing, such as the State, 
remains in the case.359 Proponents need not satisfy Article III 
standing requirements independently in such a situation because 
they can “ride ‘piggyback’ on the State’s undoubted standing” as 
long as the State remains a party to the litigation.360 
                                                                                                     
 354. See id. at 1284 (“It takes a considerable amount of money, typically in 
the millions of dollars, to secure the large number of signatures necessary to 
qualify an initiative for the ballot. Well-funded interest groups therefore play an 
outsized role in the initiative process.”). 
 355. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (“[A] 
plaintiff cannot achieve standing to litigate a substantive issue by bringing suit 
for the cost of bringing suit.”). 
 356. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2665 (distinguishing qui tam and 
informer’s suits). 
 357. See id. (indicating that plaintiffs need injury of their own for standing). 
 358. Id. at 2667–68; United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684–89 
(2013). 
 359. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 431 n.19 (1998) 
(“Because both the City of New York and the healthcare appellees have 
standing, we need not consider whether the appellee unions also have standing 
to sue.”); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (indicating that, because at 
least one appellee had standing, the Court “therefore need not consider the 
standing issue as to the [other appellees]”); Elliott, supra note 234, at 204 n.278 
(“[T]he Court has regularly allowed parties without standing to participate in 
lawsuits so long as they have the same interest as a party that does have 
standing.”). 
 360. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986). 
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Hollingsworth would have been decided on the merits, except 
that state officials refused to remain in the case.361 This raises 
the question whether, and to what extent, initiative laws can 
compel state officials to appeal and prevent another 
Hollingsworth. Officials, such as attorneys general who are often 
directly elected, possess independent discretion and authority 
and have sworn to uphold the Constitution.362 It would raise 
serious separation of powers and even ethical concerns to force 
them to continue litigating in defense of laws they consider 
unredeemably unconstitutional.363 
The Obama Administration’s course in the Windsor case 
provides a potential way out of this conundrum, albeit one that 
the Supreme Court criticized. In the Windsor litigation, the 
Department of Justice took all the formal steps required to 
litigate the validity of the Defense of Marriage Act, such as filing 
a notice of appeal and ultimately a petition for certiorari, but 
within its papers it consistently argued that the statute was not 
valid, leaving it to attorneys representing the House of 
Representatives as intervenor to defend it on the merits.364 The 
Supreme Court expressed skepticism of this approach but 
ultimately held that the federal government had Article III 
standing.365 The Court concluded that the “United States retains 
a stake sufficient to support Article III jurisdiction on appeal and 
in proceedings before the Court,” even though it agreed with the 
judgment against it.366 It also emphasized that this approach 
avoided a different separation of powers problem:  
                                                                                                     
 361. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct 2652, 2663 (2013) (indicating that 
the State of California had standing, which would have allowed the case to 
proceed to the merits had it remained in the case). 
 362. See Zeitlin, supra note 162, at 336–40 (discussing the discretion of the 
attorney general to defend an initiative in court). 
 363. Cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) (“When the 
Executive makes a principled determination that a statute is unconstitutional, 
it faces a difficult choice.”). 
 364. See id. at 2683–84 (explaining that the “Attorney General of the United 
States notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the 
Department of Justice would no longer defend the constitutionality of DOMA’s 
§ 3”); id. at 2699 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Solicitor General’s brief 
asked the Court to affirm the judgment of the court of appeals). 
 365. See id. at 2686 (majority opinion) (“For these reasons, the prudential 
and Article III requirements are met here.”). 
 366. Id. It is not clear from the Windsor decision exactly what retained 
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[I]f the Executive’s agreement with a plaintiff that a law is 
unconstitutional is enough to preclude judicial review, then 
the Supreme Court’s primary role in determining the 
constitutionality of a law that has inflicted real injury on a 
plaintiff who has brought a justiciable legal claim would 
become only secondary to the President’s.367  
Finally, the Court concluded that “the prudential concerns 
that otherwise might counsel against hearing an appeal from a 
decision with which the principal parties agree” were not present, 
as a “sharp adversarial presentation” was assured by the 
participation of the House’s lawyers, and “precedential guidance” 
was required for the lower courts.368  
Similarly, a state statute or initiative could oblige the 
attorney general or other officials to take at least the formal, 
ministerial actions required to enable a defense of the initiative. 
When the officials charged with defending Proposition 8 declined 
to file a notice of appeal of the district court’s judgment, 
supporters of the measure sought a writ of mandamus, which the 
state courts denied because there was no clear legal duty to do 
so.369 That decision was correct under then-applicable law, but if 
such a duty were created, the state would remain a party, and 
proponents could be heard regardless of whether they met Article 
                                                                                                     
interest by the government constitutes a “stake sufficient” to satisfy Article III 
standing when the government agrees with the plaintiff. Id. The Court stressed 
the government’s economic interest in the unpaid refund sought by Windsor, but 
it also relied on INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), where no such economic 
interest was present. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686 (referring to Chadha as a 
comparable case). In Chadha, where the Executive agreed with a lower court’s 
decision barring it from deporting Chadha over the objections of one House of 
Congress, the Court found that the INS was “‘sufficiently aggrieved by the Court 
of Appeals decision prohibiting it from taking action it would otherwise take’, 
regardless of whether the agency welcomed the judgment.” Id. (quoting Chadha, 
462 U.S. at 930) (citations omitted). How strictly the Court will apply this 
retained interest requirement for Article III standing remains to be seen. 
 367. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688. 
 368. Id. 
 369. See Zeitlin, supra note 162, at 327 n.2 (“The petition for review 
denied.”); see also Bob Egelko, Court Won’t Force State to Defend Proposition 8, 
S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Court-won-t-
force-state-to-defend-Prop-8-3176159.php (last visited Aug. 23, 2013) (noting 
that the court dismissed the petition without comment) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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III requirements.370 On the other hand, this narrow duty would 
not invade the discretion of officials to refuse to defend laws they 
believed to violate the Constitution. As in Windsor, they could file 
the papers necessary to appeal, but argue on the merits that the 
lower court’s decision was correct.371 This use of the Windsor 
paradigm would address the one-way ratchet problem by 
ensuring that government officials who were opponents of the 
initiative could not insulate a decision from review by refusing to 
appeal. It would also address the separation of powers concern 
raised by the Supreme Court—that courts, not other branches of 
government, should have the ultimate responsibility for 
determining the constitutionality of statutes.372 As for the 
prudential considerations raised by the Court, a sharp 
adversarial presentation is all but assured in the initiative 
context, and this seemed to be the main focus of the Windsor 
Court’s qualms.373  
Of course, this path is not foolproof. The Court cautioned  
that “unusual and urgent circumstances” of judicial economy led 
the Court to decide Windsor on the merits.374 The Court 
emphasized the nationwide effects and broad scope of the law at 
issue in describing the potential for expensive and uncertain 
litigation across the country if it dismissed based on standing.375 
                                                                                                     
 370. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62–64 (1986) (“[A] State has 
standing to defend the constitutionality of its statute . . . [and] [h]ad the State 
sought review . . . an intervening defendant . . . would be entitled to seek 
review.”) 
 371. See supra note 364 and accompanying text. 
 372. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688 (discussing separation of powers). 
 373. See id. at 2687–89 (“BLAG’s sharp adversarial presentation of the 
issues satisfies the prudential concerns that otherwise might counsel against 
hearing an appeal from a decision with which the principal parties agree.”). 
 374. Id. at 2688–89  
[T]here is no suggestion here that it is appropriate for the Executive 
as a matter of course to challenge statutes in the judicial forum rather 
than making the case to Congress for their amendment or repeal. The 
integrity of the political process would be at risk if difficult 
constitutional issues were simply referred to the Court as a routine 
exercise. 
 375. See id. at 2688  
Were this Court to hold that prudential rules require it to dismiss the 
case . . . extensive litigation would ensue. The district courts in 94 
districts throughout the Nation would be without precedential 
guidance not only in tax refund suits but also in cases involving the 
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Particularly for an initiative that might impact only a subset of 
the citizens of a single state, federal courts might not sense the 
same urgency and importance and might decline to accept 
petitioners’ standing on prudential grounds.376 Going around the 
chasm is thus no more certain than our proposed paths across it. 
VII. Conclusion 
The initiative looms large in state constitutional law. The 
people are given the direct right and means to pass constitutional 
amendments and statutes despite the opposition or indifference 
of government officials. As a result, both progressives and 
conservatives have recognized the value of the initiative process 
in achieving their objectives, and have vigorously utilized it to 
their advantage.377 State standing requirements also respect and 
promote the people’s process, allowing proponents and opponents 
broad pre-election standing, usually expressly authorized by 
statute.378 The state courts have also interpreted the initiative 
laws to provide petitioners post-election intervention and 
standing rights when government officials decline to defend the 
initiative.379 The state courts consider this post-passage standing 
by petitioners to be necessary to ensure that the people’s rights in 
the initiative process are defended against government 
interference.380 
                                                                                                     
whole of DOMA’s sweep involving over 1,000 federal statutes and a 
myriad of federal regulations . . . . Rights and privileges of hundreds 
of thousands of persons would be adversely affected, pending a case in 
which all prudential concerns about justiciability are absent . . . . 
[T]he cost in judicial resources and expense of litigation for all 
persons adversely affected would be immense. 
 376. See id. (“The Court’s conclusion that this petition may be heard on the 
merits does not imply that no difficulties would ensue if this were a common 
practice in ordinary cases.”). 
 377. See supra notes 64–76 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
initiatives supported by both conservatives and progressives). 
 378. See supra Part IV.A–C (discussing general principles of standing in 
state courts and pre-election standing in the initiative process with and without 
express standing provisions). 
 379. See supra Part IV.F–G (discussing post-election standing for petitioners 
when government officials decline to defend). 
 380. See supra Part IV.F–G (stating that “the constitutionality of the 
people’s initiative is entitled to a defense”). 
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Across the constitutional divide, the federal courts have a 
very different attitude. After passage, initiatives are treated like 
any other law, to be defended, if at all, by the government 
officials who are ordinarily required to do so, even though the 
very purpose of the initiative is to avoid dependence on those 
officials.381 The state has freedom to designate what state officers 
can defend the law, but very strict limits are imposed on other 
purported agents of the state.382 The Supreme Court has never 
given private parties, including proponents, standing to defend 
the legality of the initiative unless they have a particularized 
injury at stake.383 This is true even if the initiative is thereby left 
undefended.384  
As both state and federal litigation is almost a certainty on 
important initiatives, these very different conceptions of standing 
have the potential to grossly distort or even destroy the initiative 
process. If government officials can render an initiative 
inoperable by refusing to defend it in federal court after passage, 
government officials, and not the people, ultimately control the 
initiative process.385 Many initiatives across the political 
spectrum have obvious private party plaintiffs while they have no 
obvious private party defendants who can claim a particularized 
interest in the measure’s defense as required by the Supreme 
Court. Therefore, litigation over the initiatives is essentially 
assured, but the defense of the litigation may be eliminated if 
government officials side with the plaintiffs.386 Such initiatives 
include those calling for increased environmental protection over 
industry, the elimination of vouchers for private schools, the 
imposition of tax penalties for discriminatory practices, 
restrictions on abortion measures, and limitations on marriage.387 
                                                                                                     
 381. See supra notes 77–106 and accompanying text (discussing the nature 
and purposes ballot initiatives). 
 382. See supra notes 141–47 and accompanying text (discussing authority to 
defend initiatives). 
 383. See supra Part V. 
 384. See supra Part V. 
 385. See supra Part V; Chemerinsky, supra note 72. 
 386. See Chemerinsky, supra note 72 (“[I]t . . . should not be possible for a 
few government officials to negate ballot measures they disagree with simply by 
refusing to defend them.”). 
 387. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
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Instead of these issues being decided by the ballot box, or on the 
merits in the courtroom, federal standing requirements can be 
decisive.388 Important principles of standing and federalism—
ensuring vigorous advocacy, allowing political decisions to be 
made in the political process, respecting state sovereignty, and 
limiting the federal courts—are all undermined.389 
Fortunately, there are narrow pathways still left open 
through this constitutional divide over standing. The simplest 
and most straightforward is for a special state attorney to be 
expressly designated in initiatives or other initiative legislation 
as an official defender of an initiative when the government 
officials ordinarily expected to defend the legality of the state’s 
laws decline to do so.390 To comply with Hollingsworth, the 
process for the selection and removal of the special state attorney 
should be specified, as well as oaths requiring the attorney to 
defend the constitutionality of the initiative and other state 
laws.391 As official agents of the state, representing the state’s 
interest in the legality of the initiative, the special state attorneys 
should surely satisfy federal standing requirements, regardless of 
whether they are public employees.392 Their express designation 
is also consistent with the statutory approach to standing 
common in the states to define who can sue prior to an initiative’s 
passage.393 It avoids the need for elaborate post hoc justification 
of who should be allowed to defend the statute.394 At least after 
Hollingsworth, drafters of initiatives are well advised to define 
who can defend them if they do not have confidence in the 
government officials ordinarily expected to do so. 
There are other alternatives through the constitutional 
divide as well, at least for sherpa-like drafters of state initiatives 
willing to take riskier routes through the crevasses of 
Hollingsworth. Petitioners could be expressly defined in the 
initiative or legislation governing initiatives as post-passage 
                                                                                                     
 388. See supra notes 69–76 and accompanying text. 
 389. Id. 
 390. See supra Part VI.B.1. 
 391. See supra notes 312–14 and accompanying text. 
 392. See supra notes 319–22 and accompanying text. 
 393. See supra Part III.B (discussing standing in the pre-election initiative 
process). 
 394. See supra Part VI.B.1. 
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agents of the people for the purpose of defending the initiative 
when the government declines to do so.395 The initiative, or the 
laws governing initiatives in general, could expressly require 
them to take an oath and post a bond to ensure their careful and 
competent discharge of their responsibilities to defend the 
initiative against legal challenges.396 A defense oversight 
committee, consisting of state-wide supporters of the initiative 
other than the petitioners, could also be given the power to 
replace the petitioners as defenders of the people’s interest.397 
These requirements address the particular concerns set out in 
Hollingsworth, if not its unease about anyone but government 
officials having the right to defend the legality of a statute. 
A third alternative, albeit a somewhat shaky one given the 
Supreme Court’s attempts to dismiss and distinguish qui tam 
actions as historic anomalies, is to create a bounty to be paid for 
the successful defense of an initiative when the government has 
declined to defend it.398 A fourth possibility, distinguishable from 
qui tam and informer’s actions, would allow proponents to recover 
a portion of a previously paid filing fee if they successfully defend 
the initiative in court.399 This would give a monetary interest to 
the petitioners that should be considered cognizable under Article 
III.400 And finally, it may be possible to circumvent the issue by 
retracing the path taken in Windsor—having the state appeal 
without defending on the merits—although the Supreme Court 
has indicated that the Windsor route may be closed if the Court 
would rather not decide a given case.401 
In sum, the current constitutional impasse over initiative 
standing is untenable. It serves neither the purposes of the 
initiative process nor the principles of standing and federalism.402 
                                                                                                     
 395. See supra Part VI.B.2. 
 396. See supra notes 328–30 and accompanying text. 
 397. See supra notes 331–33 and accompanying text. 
 398. See supra Part VI.B.3. 
 399. See supra Part VI.B.4. 
 400. See supra Part VI.B.4 (indicating that “petitioners would retain a 
property right in reimbursement of the filing fee,” and a claim for money is an 
injury for standing purposes). 
 401. See supra Part VI.B.5. 
 402. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2673–74 (2013) (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting) (stating that the Court’s opinion disrespects the political process 
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It disadvantages conservatives and progressives alike, and should 
be of concern to all sides.403 It is now the responsibility of 
lawmakers and the drafters of initiatives, and then ultimately of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, to choose among the proposed routes 
around the precipice and across the standing divide.  
  
                                                                                                     
in California and reflects a misunderstanding of the initiative process and the 
principles of Article III). 
 403. See supra notes 64–76 and accompanying text; cf. Elliott, supra note 64, 
at 558–79 (discussing the effect standing has on litigation brought by both 
liberals and conservatives). 
